Redefining psychology in a South African context : facilitating epistemological curiosity by Vermeulen, Justin Graeme
 i 
 
 
REDEFINING PSYCHOLOGY IN A SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT: 
FACILITATING EPISTEMOLOGICAL CURIOSITY 
 
by 
 
JUSTIN GRAEME VERMEULEN 
 
 
submitted in accordance with the requirements for                                                                   
the degree of  
 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
in the subject 
 
PSYCHOLOGY 
 
at the 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
SUPERVISOR: DR L. J. BALOYI 
JULY 2011
 ii 
 
 
Declaration 
 
 
 
Student number: 3527-423-9 
 
 
 
I declare that Redefining psychology in a South African context: Facilitating 
epistemological curiosity is my own work and all sources that I have used or quoted have 
been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references. 
 
 
 
…………………………..  
MR JUSTIN GRAEME VERMEULEN                                                          20TH JULY 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
 
DEDICATION 
 
TO MY FATHER EDUAN JOHAN VERMEULEN, I FORGIVE YOU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Western psychology has in its current position and definition laid claim to the “psychology” 
landscape, despite being the construction of one epistemology. This imposition allows 
western psychology to dominate and control the “psychology” landscape, to the detriment of 
other equally valid and “scientific” “psychologies”.  
We argue for redefinition of western psychology in terms of lived experience or soul, so that 
it can co-exist with other “psychologies”. This should co-facilitate the process of 
repositioning western psychology into a dialogically equal relationship with indigenous 
african psychology.  
Redefinition of western psychology is dependant on psychologist’s appreciation of the 
relativity of epistemological frameworks and ability to challenge their own subjectivities. 
This in turn requires epistemological curiosity.  
This study adopts a conceptual, autoethnographic approach and methodology. Our aim is not 
to provide answers, but rather create a context for dialogue.  
Key words: psychology, science, reality, epistemology, epistemological curiosity, mind, 
soul, lived experience, relativity, co-existence. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I recently visited my local Chinese take-away and restaurant to indulge my love of 
Asian food and in particular Chinese food. The restaurant is beautifully decorated with 
paper lanterns, water features and various Asian curios. The menus are written in 
broken English, much to the amusement of the western patrons. It is just as well that the 
situation is not reversed as the Chinese alphabet has hundreds of characters! 
I placed my order and sat down behind the Sushi bar. While sitting there I struck up a 
conversation with the owner, a Chinese woman who came to South Africa a few years 
ago. I asked her why she felt the need to serve Sushi in a Chinese restaurant; my 
understanding is that Sushi is actually Japanese in origin. She explained that most of 
her customers (mostly westerners) were unaware of this and insist on ordering it. They 
somehow assume that anyone with Asian features must be capable of serving the 
currently trendy “Sushi”. I couldn’t help but feel that this was insulting and insensitive 
to her culture. I had also noticed that the supposed “Sushi” was all cooked! Now as far 
as I know all Sushi is raw fish? So I asked her why this was the case? She indicated 
that her patrons were nervous of raw fish and would only eat the “pseudo Sushi” if it 
was pre-cooked. 
I was astonished at the insensitivity of this western context. The customers wanted to 
experience the “exotic” but only if it conformed to their standards of acceptability. To 
offer authentic Chinese food was not enough, it had to be supplemented with Japanese, 
and as I later discovered Thai, Malay and even Vietnamese food; to meet the western 
fetishes and requirements. 
 
 
                                                                                                    (Narrative by researcher) 
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  CLARIFICATION OF TERMINOLOGY 
 
Before attempting to discuss the current study, and given the potential for misunderstandings, 
it is necessary first to clarify the choice and rationale underlying the use of certain words and 
terminology. It is common practice in “psychology” literature to see the use of the term 
mainstream psychology, to refer to the currently dominant, western psychology and its 
various subdivisions. For the purposes of this study we argue for the use of the term western 
psychology to represent the psychological experiences of people functioning within a western 
epistemology, and mainstream “psychology”, “to which all ‘psychologies’ should be equal 
contributors”, denoting the broader “psychology” landscape. We also argue for the use of the 
term african “psychology”, to denote african experiences in their own right, thus african 
epistemology, theory and methodology as independent, and a dialogical partner to other 
“psychologies”. We thus advocate the notion of western psychology and african 
“psychology” as two contributors to the mainstream, in an equal dialogical relationship with 
all other “psychologies” globally, that constitute the mainstream or total “psychology” 
landscape. We have thus written the terms western and african in lower case, to represent 
their equality. We have also used inverted commas when referring to african “psychology” 
and indigenous “psychology”, because non-western people are more than capable of 
describing their “psychology” in their own words. It is only for the sake of clarity that we use 
the term “psychology” in this study. For example, african “psychology” would probably be 
better referred to as moya, as proposed by Baloyi (2008). These terms are however still in the 
process of finding their unique voice and definition. Accordingly it is with humble reluctance 
that we have compromised and used the term “psychology”. 
In addition to the aforementioned terminology, this study also refers to “we” instead of “I”.  
While it is true that this work is a reflection of the author’s personal process and 
development, it has also occurred in a community of people and other authors. Accordingly 
this study reflects their collective thoughts, experiences and aspirations as well. The work 
presented in this study is thus a reflection of the efforts by many dedicated people, who have 
endeavoured to give expression to the lived experiences of people on the periphery, through 
their commitment to humanity and equality.  It is thus illogical to refer to “I”, when in fact 
there can only be “we”. 
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THESIS 
 
The argument we present in this study, is that a similar situation to the one presented in the 
opening vignette plays itself out in western psychology, through a process of selective 
inclusion of indigenous or non-western knowledge into western psychology. Indigenous 
philosophical concepts, which are superficially congruent with a western epistemology, such 
as ubuntu, are selectively included into western psychology or are modified to become 
acceptable. Our experience and observation is that this form of “inclusion” is advocated as a 
desirable goal in western psychological literature and thinking. The question we raise is 
whether this “inclusion”, of indigenous knowledge systems into western psychology, should 
be the goal in the first place? In this study we argue for the co-existence of knowledge 
systems as dialogical equals. We therefore argue that, instead of including indigenous 
knowledge systems into western psychology that these knowledge systems should rather co-
exist as dialogical equals, in a “psychology” and knowledge systems landscape. In such a 
context it is easier to facilitate a sense of curiosity about different epistemological 
frameworks and their “psychologies”. In order for these changes to be implemented, it is 
however essential that we redefine our current understanding of western psychology.     
Furthermore, redefinition of our current understanding of western psychology is critical for 
ensuring a relevant, sustainable future for “psychology” as a field in South Africa. 
Redefinition is thus an opportunity to reflect on where western psychology is at present and 
how it should be positioned in the future. For western psychology to have a viable future in 
Africa it must establish itself into a dialogically equal relationship with indigenous african 
“psychologies”. The western psychological community should to this end foster a sense of 
curiosity in indigenous knowledge systems and their “psychology” equivalents. Doing so 
may make it easier to introduce the idea of “psychological” co-existence in a “psychology” 
landscape. Such co-existence of western psychology with its indigenous equivalents would 
greatly enhance “psychologists” ability to meet the “psychological” needs of their clients. 
Western psychology accordingly has the opportunity to contribute to remediation of the 
injustices of the past, moving beyond mere tolerance of difference or selective inclusion, to 
appreciation of “psychological” diversity.  
Those who hold dominant “psychological” discourses may perceive redefinition of western 
psychology as being threatening and unwarranted. We however view redefinition of western 
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psychology as a way of addressing the local and global need for a relevant “psychology”. Our 
argument is that taking up the challenge of redefinition will help western psychology respond 
to developments by indigenous “psychologies”, thus broadening the “psychology” landscape. 
Moreover the research conducted by Baloyi (2008) argues that indigenous knowledge 
systems must, and indeed are seeking definition in their own right. In addition to this it is 
clear that these knowledge systems are as legitimate as those generated in the west. Part of 
the thesis defended in the current study is that western psychology cannot ignore these facts 
and continue to practice in the same way as before in South Africa. This is because the 
political and knowledge landscapes have changed dramatically in the last decade. Western 
psychology should therefore respond, encourage, embrace and adapt itself to developments in 
self definition by indigenous “psychologies”, which were silenced under apartheid. Western 
psychology should thus help reposition itself as relative and equal to indigenous 
“psychology”, rather than imposing conditions for acceptability and legitimacy on African 
knowledge systems. 
 
SITUATING WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Jordaan and Jordaan (1998) note that our understanding of what “psychology” is, and where 
it came from is usually in line with a western cultural perspective and epistemology. In other 
words the western term “psychology”, as constructed within a western history, culture and 
epistemology, is seen as representative of all “psychologies”. Within this narrow definition, 
“psychology” is thus understood to be a field that historically explored the relationship 
between body and mind, which could trace its origins back to ancient Greek philosophy. 
Today “psychology” is of course defined far more broadly and includes perspectives such as 
the ecosystemic approach, which focuses on patterns of meaning in context and peoples 
underlying epistemologies or ways of thinking and knowing (Moore, 2003). Despite this 
broader understanding and definition of what “psychology” is, it remains a western 
construction. It thus becomes problematic when we attempt to “find” indigenous 
“psychologies” that fit our current understanding of “psychology”.  
Even more problematic is when attempts are made to apply dominant western psychology to 
indigenous people, who have their own historically subjugated and marginalised 
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“psychology”. Jordaan and Jordaan (1998) for example, acknowledge the flaw of trying to 
apply a western scientific approach to african “psychology”, in order to link stories, proverbs 
and rituals to human behaviour. Yet these authors seem to have difficulty moving beyond 
advocating this approach. The tendency thus remains to see a western scientific approach as 
all encompassing and superior to all other ways of knowing.  
The assumption that knowledge can only be legitimate if it has been investigated by western 
rational, systematic, scientific means or approaches pervades most of the literature of western 
psychology. Knowledge generated in “unscientific” or non-western ways is rejected. This has 
resulted in a misfit for any human experience that contradicts western ways of thinking. 
Richards (1997, p. 297) argues that, “western psychology’s problem in this respect rests in 
large part on its desperate aspirations to the status of a natural science in quest of universal 
laws, and psychologists’ own self-images, as this kind of scientist.” Gergen, Gulerce, Lock 
and Misra (cited in Mkhize, 2004) argue that this attempt at replicating the natural sciences 
led to the construction of western psychology as a value free, objective and universal science. 
This of course means that ontologies, epistemologies and cultures which do not conform to 
this scientific communities thinking, are not seen as offering anything of value to the worlds 
knowledge landscape.           
Dominant western knowledge systems and ways of knowing and doing, including western 
scientific psychology have thus served to silence and minimise the position of indigenous 
knowledge systems in South Africa (Baloyi, 2008). Baloyi further argues that western 
psychology has made universal claims to knowledge and experience, despite the fact that it is 
a western construction and thus inappropriate for describing the lived experiences of African 
indigenous people. Staeuble (2007, p. 89) voices a similar argument, noting that the, 
“…dominant mode of psychological knowledge production has effectively marginalised, 
subalternalised, or even precluded alternative modes of knowing”. According to Baloyi 
(2008) the exclusion of indigenous knowledge, practices and “psychology” has resulted in the 
marginalising of African experiences and epistemologies. Equally problematic is the denial of 
the existence of such a situation or the impact of for example racism in maintaining this status 
quo. Foster (2004) indicates that those in dominant positions or those who function within a 
dominant framework, use denial as a way to justify a lack of action and in the process 
become blind to the situation. The fact that western psychology as a field continues to meet 
the needs of few South Africans and is perceived as an elitist science serving a chosen few is 
evidence of this situation (Wilson, Richter, Durrhein, Surendorff & Asafo-Agyei, 1999). 
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Clearly psychologists who were trained in western paradigms will have to re-examine the 
way in which they practice in a South African context and acknowledge their personal and 
training biases.   
Psychologists thus need to be aware of their biases towards working within certain 
epistemological frameworks. Campbell (cited in Cecchin, Lane & Wendel, 1994) notes that if 
psychologists do not reflect on their prejudices, they cannot model open, explorative thinking 
for their clients, whose problems are often based on their own prejudices. Campbell goes on 
to point out the danger of seeing one worldview, or in the case of this study western scientific 
psychology, as superior to other ways of knowing and doing. In a multicultural society, such 
as that of South Africa, there is a need for integrative, contextually sensitive approaches that 
draw on knowledge from various worldviews. Western psychology should therefore develop 
openness to sharing and co-evolving knowledge and practices that will better meet the needs 
of all South Africans. Keeney (1986) calls for honesty in the western psychology community, 
even if at times this feels threatening, to not be afraid of letting go of absolute certainty in 
beliefs and assumptions. Keeney (1986) encourages psychologists to acknowledge their own 
epistemological beliefs and consider how these influence what they see and do, thus 
developing epistemological awareness. Keeney warns that failure to do so can result in 
approaches that are dehumanising for clients. Abuse of western psychology to enforce racist 
agendas in South Africa is evidence of one such dehumanising discourse. The tendency to 
trust in certain ways of knowing and doing, or what Keeney (1986) refers to as “closet 
worship”, typifies Eurocentric views of privileged knowledge or superior epistemologies. 
Lappin (1983) argues that in addition to developing epistemological awareness, and directly 
related to it, psychologists need to become culturally conscious. This requires psychologists 
to approach clients from an almost anthropological stance, observing rules and rituals in the 
context of a particular culture and epistemological framework. Lappin (1983) suggests that 
part of  the way to do this involves, firstly becoming more human, which requires joining and 
viewing people at the level of experience, rather than relying exclusively on a western 
scientific lens of observation, measurement and understanding. Secondly it requires risk and 
respect. Risk; in terms of western psychologists being courageous enough to ask people from 
other cultures to share and describe their epistemological and ontological realities, thus 
respecting a culture’s epistemology and ontology, even if it is different from how westerners 
understand the world. What Lappin (1983) does not consider, but does seem to imply is the 
requirement and development of a sense of curiosity in different cultures and epistemologies. 
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More specifically this implies epistemological curiosity, which Freire (1998) refers to as an 
advanced stage in the knowing process. It involves reaching a point where you can see 
knowledge generated from pure experience as being of great value, rather than relying on 
western scientific rigour alone. Epistemological curiosity occurs when you are able to remain 
curious, and are capable of self-criticism. In our view epistemological curiosity is a deep, 
reflective and honest desire to engage with epistemologies that differ from our own, allowing 
them to inform our thinking, to challenge our ways of knowing and inform our ways of being. 
It is evident from the preceding literature and arguments that western psychology has failed 
to reflect and grow from indigenous contexts. Instead western psychology as part of the 
broader western scientific community has imposed itself on indigenous people, disregarding 
local knowledge and experiences and functioning as an all encompassing framework and 
knowledge landscape. This attitude of imposition and superiority has not worked and a new 
sustainable alternative is required.    
 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Western psychology as a “science” functions within the epistemological limits of western 
thinking, which accordingly delineates what can constitute legitimate, normal and universal 
experiences. Western psychology thus reflects only a limited range of potential human 
experience and is inappropriate for describing the lived experiences of for example, African 
indigenous peoples. Baloyi (2008, p. 72) argues that, “the very use of the term “psychology” 
in many African communities and universities poses a serious problem… (as it is) conceived 
out of a foreign epistemology and ontology.” In its current definition, it is challenging to find 
equivalents to western psychology or indigenous “psychologies”, amongst non-western 
cultures. This also makes it difficult to place western psychology in a relative and equal 
position to indigenous “psychologies”, which helps keep western psychology in a position of 
dominance and imposition. A further complication is that the western understanding of 
“psyche” and “psychology” has become distorted and fragmented. For example, “psyche” 
means soul, yet western psychology focuses on the mind. This has served to disconnect the 
“psychology” field from being a way of understanding human experiences in their totality, to 
a focus on the single experiential fragment of “mind”. Typical of this is the definition of 
“psyche”, in the APA dictionary of psychology (VandenBos, 2006), which views “psyche” as 
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the mind in its totality, separate from the physical organism. When western psychologists 
undertake cross-cultural studies, using this dominant fragmented definition, they fail to find 
“psychology” anywhere except in the west. They then claim that “psychology” is a western 
invention.   
Strodtbeck and Whiting (cited in Clark, 1998, p. 9) argue further that, “the very words cross-
cultural have become alienating to mainstream psychologists… (Who) have become so 
focused on cross-cultural comparisons, universal generalizations, and methodological 
refinements that they have lost touch with advances in their own home countries.” This is true 
of the situation in South Africa as well, with the on-going emphasis on including indigenous 
knowledge and practices into western psychology, despite advances by African 
epistemologies that are finding a voice in their own right. Inclusion, understood here to be the 
tendency to simply include indigenous knowledge and practices into western scientific 
frameworks as opposed to co-existence of frameworks, is highly problematic. This is 
especially so when inclusion is selective or when indigenous knowledge and practices are 
manipulated to better fit with western standards and frameworks. Hammersmith (2007, p. 
166) contends that, “when institutions limit their indigenous approaches to inclusion of 
indigenous content without recognising, supporting or facilitating inclusion of context and 
indigenous teaching and learning methods they go off track, because the most important 
elements are left out.” Baloyi (2008) argues that western psychology has laid claim to 
universal knowledge and experience, establishing itself as the norm for all human beings. In 
order to maintain this faulty status it is hardly surprising that western psychology should want 
to include those components of an African epistemology that confirm this all encompassing 
discourse. Batiste and Henderson (cited in Hammersmith, 2007, pp. 44-45) further this 
argument by pointing out the problem of, “cognitive imperialism devaluing indigenous 
knowledge and heritage while taking elements out of context and claiming them for itself.”      
Hammersmith (2007) argues strongly for tolerance by western science of indigenous 
epistemologies. Yet tolerance in our opinion is problematic, as it implies selective inclusion 
of indigenous knowledge and an uncomfortable process of forced interest in difference. In the 
context of major social and political changes in South Africa, engendering a sense of 
tolerance of difference and knowledge system diversity is faulty. Tolerance equates to 
managing the legal imperative to allow indigenous knowledge and practices to infiltrate 
western psychology. Tolerance in the context of this study is thus an obstacle to equality 
between western psychology and indigenous “psychology”, as it reinforces selectively 
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inclusive practices. This study therefore in part challenges the notion of tolerance of diversity 
and instead argues for appreciation, which by contrast implies co-existence of dialogical 
equals. With this in mind we also argue for development of epistemological curiosity to 
facilitate a shift from tolerance, to appreciation of epistemological difference.  
 
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
Mkhize (2004, p. 28) argues for, “a dynamic relationship of worldviews… (because) people 
are exposed to multiple perspectives, (and) once incorporated into people’s ways of thinking; 
these perspectives are capable of entering into a dynamic relationship with each other. This 
process may result in the emergence of new (knowledge) out of the old. It is this dialogue 
between perspectives that is of psychological significance.” In other words, an equal 
dialogical engagement between western psychology and indigenous “psychology” will create 
opportunities for the co-evolving of mutually beneficial ideas and solutions for the 
“psychological” needs of South Africans and the communities they create. This provides a 
context for knowledge system equality, while still preserving the unique identity of each 
perspective. It is in line with this image of equality that we put forth the following aims and 
objectives for this study. 
 
AIMS 
 
The broad aim of this study is to argue for the development of an equal dialogical relationship 
between western psychology and indigenous “psychology”, where western psychology is 
repositioned as relative and dialogically equal to indigenous “psychology”.                                              
We also aim to respond to the call by researchers such as Keeney (1983), for honesty, to 
question our beliefs and assumptions, and to promote this process of self reflection in the 
western psychology community. 
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Finally, this study aims to facilitate epistemological curiosity, by engaging in open minded 
inquiry, thus allowing new ideas to emerge from the research process, which contribute to the 
dialogue on diverse knowledge systems in South Africa. 
 
OBJECTIVES 
 
With these broad aims in mind the current study proposes the following objectives. The first 
objective being to investigate, how western psychology came to be defined as the 
“psychology” landscape. A further objective in this regard, is to investigate whether 
redefinition will facilitate a repositioning, of western psychology as relative and equal to 
indigenous “psychology”.    
The second objective is to investigate the difference between the co-existence of 
“psychologies” versus the inclusion of indigenous “psychology”, into western psychology. 
This requires examination of the rationale underlying inclusion and a questioning of whether 
it should be a goal in the first place.  
The third and final objective is to investigate the potential role played by epistemological 
curiosity in the western psychological redefinition process. The goal is to determine, whether 
epistemological curiosity can help psychologists shift from tolerance of epistemological 
difference to appreciation of epistemological diversity.   
 
PARADIGMATIC PERSPECTIVE 
 
This study is framed within a meta-theoretical perspective, based on our understanding of the 
relativity of the “psychologies” that inhabit a “psychology” landscape. This is similar, yet 
fundamentally different from a postmodern, social constructionist framework. Our argument 
in this regard is that social constructionism itself can only account for the existence of 
theories and paradigms generated within a western epistemology. Any “psychology” in the 
“psychology” landscape can thus only generalise information to itself. Furthermore, and for 
the sake of clarity, we can argue that an equivalent to “social constructionism” may be put 
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forth by any of the “psychologies” occupying the “psychology” landscape. This means that 
there would be a variety of “social constructionism” like perspectives. The point being that 
social constructionism can only explain the existence of all “psychologies”, when western 
psychology is falsely positioned as the “psychology” landscape, rather than a participant in 
the landscape. It is also worth noting then that because this study uses a meta-perspective it 
drifts into the territory of a “third order of cybernetics”, or stated differently taking a relative 
position on perspectives of relativity generated by different independent “psychologies”. 
However despite this, if this study does in fact cross into a “third order perspective” then it is 
definitely a product of western psychology and is limited as such by the challenges 
acknowledged here. Hence we cannot claim to objectively account for what we refer to as the 
“psychology” landscape, but merely give a western psychological description of it. This will 
help bring about equality between different “epistemologies” and their corresponding 
“psychologies”.                                                                                                                 
Social constructionism is thus in our opinion always a product of a western epistemology and 
cannot objectively explain, nor account for any other “psychologies”. Social constructionism 
cannot for example, account for African indigenous peoples “psychology”. While the social 
constructionist lens is useful for sensitising the western scientific psychology community to 
the relative nature of frameworks and perspectives, it should not be seen as an all 
encompassing, universal, culture transcending way of knowing. Despite this approach’s 
shortcomings, its ability to reflect how reality can be constructed in language is useful for 
westerners and facilitates the process of critiquing western psychology. We therefore give a 
brief overview of the social constructionist perspective which informed this study and the 
later development of our meta-perspective, but argue for it to be seen within the 
epistemological limits of western thinking. 
 
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST PERSPECTIVE 
 
In the Postmodern, Social Constructionist perspective language is seen as the focus of 
investigation. According to Becvar and Becvar (2006, pp. 91-92), “… language is not a 
reporting device for our experience, or representationalism. Rather it is a defining framework. 
Thus, a change in language equals a change in the experience, for reality can only be 
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experienced, and the “reality” experienced is inseparable from the pre-packaged thoughts of 
society…” Accordingly the focus is on how we co-evolve shared understandings and 
meaning through language. Language is seen as a context within which we narrate or story 
reality. Durrheim, Kelly and Terre Blanche (2006, pp. 278-279) state that, 
“constructionism…holds that the human life-world is fundamentally constituted in language 
and that language itself should therefore be the object of study.” Durrheim et al. (2006) note 
that social sonstructionism does have an explicitly critical element, this is of value when 
pointing out failings by approaches such as positivism in claiming to be value neutral. 
Durrheim et al. (2006) do however warn that social constructionists can suffer from idealism 
in reducing everything to language and an over emphasis on relativism where all descriptions 
of reality are simply constructions. Thus any text or interpretation becomes equal, and 
notions such as colonisation become acceptable. Clearly even social sonstructionism can go 
too far, when dehumanising practices are seen as nothing more than constructions, and the 
very real human impact is overlooked and downplayed. 
In line with our “third Order Cybernetic” approach, conceived out of a Postmodern, Social 
Constructionist framework, this study is to be conducted according to the following tenets 
which Becvar and Becvar (2006, p. 345) summarise as follows, “(1) A reality may exist 
independently of us, but we cannot know reality. (2) The reality that exists for us and the 
reality we can observe is relative to the theory we use as a metaphor for that reality. (3) What 
we can observe is a function of the means we use to measure the phenomena of interest and 
our theories, which suggest what might be “out there”. (4) Reality is a dynamic, evolving, 
changing entity. (5) To observe a phenomenon is to change the nature of the phenomenon 
observed. (6) Phenomena observed take on the characteristics of the theory or model used to 
guide and systematise the observations. (7) The appropriate unit of analysis is not elementary 
parts but relationships, which should be the basis of all definitions (including that of western 
psychology).” 
Given the diversity of epistemological orientations in South Africa and internationally it 
makes sense, and is appropriate to deconstruct our understandings of “psychology”, inclusion 
and tolerance of epistemological difference in terms of the aforementioned perspective. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This study is conceptual (theoretical) in nature, but is complemented by a series of narratives 
and personal communications (unstructured conversations) with academics, healers and 
students. Participants were initially identified through convenience sampling, followed by a 
snowball method to gain additional participants. Participants were split into two groups, 
according to their potential contribution. The first group conversed with the researcher, in 
order to co-evolve the theoretical aspects of this study.  The second group submitted 
narratives, which contributed to the collective, communal knowledge generation process 
employed in this study. Participation was voluntary and there was no perceivable risk of harm 
to participants. Participants were also given a consent form (appendix); indicating that 
participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw from the study at any time. This 
information gathering process was done in conjunction with a focused literature review, 
which helped build the philosophical groundwork for our arguments. 
In addition to the narratives, personal communications and focused literature review, we have 
included an autoethnographic research component. This was done in order to authentically 
represent the researcher’s personal journey and inform the other methodological components. 
Autoethnography takes the personal experiences of the researcher and uses them as research 
data (Holman, 2008). In this study we thus included dialogues, poetry and narratives that 
complemented the “scientific” components through their aesthetic value and ability to reflect 
the researcher’s personal lived experience. 
This methodology is consistent with our proposed “third order cybernetic” paradigm and thus 
articulates part of our ontological and epistemological framework. It is within this paradigm 
that the research is framed and viewed.  We applied our “third order cybernetic” approach to 
the current definition of western psychology, with an emphasis on investigating the 
ecological value of a new epistemologically and contextually sensitive definition of western 
psychology.  
This study therefore amounts to a critical theoretical analysis of these western 
epistemological understandings from a meta-theoretical perspective. The Unisa guide to 
masters and doctoral studies in psychology (2009, p. 56) indicates that a theoretical study of 
this nature involves, “…a kind of philosophical analysis”, and hence cannot stipulate a 
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specific design in advance as is the case with empirical studies. Accordingly we allowed time 
and space for unexpected opportunities and research developments. 
 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
Chapter 1:       Introduction, Rationale and overview. 
 
Chapter 2:      The history of western psychology. 
 
Chapter 3:      Psychology in context. 
 
Chapter 4:      Redefining western psychology in a South African context. 
 
Chapter 5:      Facilitating epistemological curiosity.   
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CHAPTER 2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This “Psychology”  
Spirits talk in dreams to me,                                                                                                                
how is this not Psychology?                                                                                                                                                   
Witchcraft lacks validity,                                                                                                                      
excluded without reliability!                                                                                                                  
Human experience… so called Psyche?                                                                                             
Why do you dismiss me?                                                                                                                    
Existential reality…                                                                                                                             
if not universal, it cannot be!                                                                                                              
Ubuntu included selectively,                                                                                                                    
rituals afforded no legitimacy!                                                                                                          
Fragmentation and hypocrisy,                                                                                                            
Psychology has no place for me! 
Disconnected in paradise,                                                                                                                   
why should we sacrifice ?...                                                                                                                  
the coloniser, the imperialist,                                                                                                                    
epistemology with a fist !!!                                                                                                               
Academic and rational,                                                                                                                    
no place for the immeasurable!                                                                                                          
Isolation in community,                                                                                                                          
do we deny our humanity?                                                                                                                  
Ignorance of ecology,                                                                                                                         
Science says, there is nothing to see!                                                                                                     
Take me to Psychology...                                                                                                                   
the evidence for reality. 
Adopt the language,                                                                                                                            
corrupt your mind!                                                                                                                         
A coloniser of another kind!                                                                                                            
You place us in a double bind,                                                                                                          
as if we have nothing left to find!                                                                                                         
Psychology… so value free?                                                                                                               
Psychology let it be!                                                                                                                           
Impose on me…                                                                                                                                
with legitimacy?                                                                                                                                    
Impose on me,                                                                                                                                     
this “Psychology”.                                                                            (Poem by researcher) 
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This chapter will focus on the historical developments that shaped the western understanding 
of psychology, as well as the etymology (history) of the western terms psyche (soul and 
mind) and psychology, with reference to our contemporary understanding of these terms 
today. To do this, it is necessary to consider historical developments in the western 
conception of body, soul and mind, as they influence shifts in the etymology of psyche and 
psychology. Furthermore in order to effectively situate this study in a South African context 
the historical introduction of western psychology to Africa and specifically South Africa 
needs to be considered. 
Literature on the history of western psychology typically proceeds with an account of ancient 
Greek philosophy, which is logical given that “psyche” is a Greek derivative. In most cases 
this is followed by a delineation of significant events and contributions by people over the 
centuries to western thinking, on issues relating to mind, soul and body. This process allows 
researchers to trace the term psychology back to its origins. The overview presented here by 
contrast is an attempt to critically examine developments in the use of the terms psyche and 
psychology, from their Greek origins to the present day, in the broader context of 
developments in western thinking. 
The available literature also tends to implicitly show that western thinkers “discovered” 
“psychological” thought, falsely laying claim to something that is possibly older than modern 
humans themselves. Baloyi (2008) points out that this tendency of the west to claim certain 
philosophical concepts, while denying them to other cultures is common. Accordingly it is 
important to emphasise that what is investigated here is not “the” history of “psychology”, 
but rather the history of western psychology and the corresponding etymology of the western 
terms psyche and psychology.    
 
CLARIFICATION OF THE TERM ETYMOLOGY 
 
Etymology refers to, “the study of the origin and history of words and their meanings” 
(Hornby, 2000, p. 395). More specifically in the context of this study, the ‘etymology’ of 
words is an attempt to account for changes in their usage, and how words mean different 
things at different times in history. It is logical then that the particular language, culture and 
epistemology within which the words are formed, should also be examined.    
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 PSYCHE AND PSYCHOLOGY: CLASSICAL GREEK ORIGINS 
 
Greek religion and mythology were closely linked to the ancient western understanding of the 
world, and provided the context in which the Greeks formed their ideas on what it is to be a 
human being, that later led to the name psychology (Jordaan & Jordaan, 1998). Early Greek 
religion could be divided into two main streams, the Olympians who believed that there were 
many gods, who engaged in similar activities to wealthy Greeks and the Dionysiac-Orphics, 
who believed that the soul was a prisoner in the body that had a longing desire to be released, 
so that it could be amongst the gods again (Hergenhahn, 2005).  People in both sects were 
considered to be under divine control; accordingly, minimal consideration was given to the 
notion of an individual, independent self and any explanations about reality or human 
existence, tended to be supernatural.  
The first Greek philosophers departed from this way of thinking, emphasising natural, 
objective explanations instead of supernatural ones. They attempted to isolate the single 
primary element or physis from which everything else was made. Thales (636-545 BC) for 
example, claimed that water was the physis, from which everything else could be derived; 
this is often acknowledged as the first “scientific” statement. We would however argue that it 
was the first recorded, western scientific statement. For Heraclitus the physis was fire and for 
Pythagoras it was numbers (Hergenhahn, 2005). Pythagoras however differed from most 
early Greek philosophers, in that he believed in a separate mind and body or dualism, for him 
there was a clear separation between the physical and abstract, so a physis, would need to 
underlie both tangible and intangible matter. By contrast philosophers like Heraclitus were 
monists, making no distinction between body and mind. Pythagoras in addition to dualistic 
thinking reflected a number of epistemological characteristics that to this day underlie 
western thinking. For example, he argued that numbers could only be understood by the use 
of rationality and that sensory experience would inhibit the attainment of abstract knowledge. 
For Pythagoras human experience was thus not a legitimate source of knowledge. In the 
modern discipline of western psychology there is still an emphasis on rational, objective, 
systematic, “scientific” knowledge, reflecting the pervasiveness of this ancient western 
framework, which frequently seeks to de-legitimise any knowledge systems that do not 
conform to this way of knowing and doing. 
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In the fifth century BC, Empedocles and Hippocrates argued that there were four basic 
elements; earth, air, fire and water. In the ancient Greek framework human beings were now 
considered to be manifestations of these elements, for example: Bones and muscle tissue 
were seen as earth. Empedocles postulated that love combined these elements to create a 
whole, such as a human being, while strife, served to separate the elements. The only thing 
that did not represent one of these elements was the “mind” or “soul”, known as psyche; 
therefore there had to be something that existed beyond physical matter (Gentile and Miller, 
2009). But why did the Greeks refer to this unobservable element as psyche? 
The word psyche comes from the Greek legend of Psyche and Eros, where, “…Psyche is a 
personification of the soul in the form of a beautiful girl who, having lost her divine lover, 
Eros, is eventually reunited with him and made immortal” (Baloyi, 2008, p. 62). The process 
of becoming immortal meant that Psyche became a spirit; hence the word “psyche” came to 
represent the unobservable aspects of human beings. The Greeks did not however understand 
“psyche” as it is understood today in western contexts. For them it initially referred to an 
aspect of living things that was not part of the physical body. This is frequently translated as 
the mind in its totality and its various functions, or as the spirit or soul (O’ Boyle, 2006). As 
far back as Homer in the ninth century BC, psyche was seen as vital force occupying the 
human body and departing it at death (Jordaan & Jordaan, 1998). Psyche was thus understood 
by the Greeks to be part of a biological process that sustained life and could literally be 
understood as meaning “to breathe”. Thales for example defined the psyche or soul as that 
which causes motion in objects, anything capable of independently moving then had “soul”. 
Soul could not continue to exist after death because the ability to initiate motion or sustain 
life was lost (O’Bloyle, 2006). At this point in time psyche or soul was understood to have 
three parts; nous, thymos and menos, these translate as: reason, will and passion (Malone, 
2009). Later translations viewed this three part “psyche” as the very essence of life, or energy 
that differentiates living organisms like animals and plants, from non-living substances such 
as stones or earth. Older English translations of “psyche” generally translate it as “soul”, 
namely that aspect of human beings which can transcend death and migrate to metaphysical 
realms, which departs significantly from the original Greek meaning (O’Boyle, 2006). 
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SHIFTS IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY 
 
The shifts from supernatural ways of knowing to naturalistic perspectives resulted in factions 
within Greek philosophy and a relativity of perspectives, which impacted on understandings 
of knowledge and notions surrounding the function or composition of the psyche. The 
Sophist philosophers, for example, came to the conclusion that culture, beliefs, education and 
personal experiences, along with communication skills, determined whether arguments, 
would be accepted by others, and that this did not really bring you any closer to the truth. 
This was of course very similar to contemporary postmodernism (Hergenhahn, 2005). The 
philosopher Socrates was particularly interested in Sophist teachings, due to their focus on 
human affairs, ethics and epistemology (Malone, 2009). For Socrates, wisdom lay in 
knowledge of one’s ignorance and the only way to be a good person and to make a 
meaningful contribution to society, was to be true to your culture, while being humble about 
your knowledge.  As is evident from the Sophist thinking, some Greek philosophers were 
aware of the limitations of their thinking, that thinking was a function of their epistemology 
and that all people have their own epistemology. The obvious question then is how did the 
discipline of western psychology develop in such a way that it regularly makes universal 
claims to knowledge and experience, when even at its very roots, awareness of 
epistemological limitations existed? Another poignant Sophist notion is that unique human 
experiences and culture impact on what we understand to be true or real. It therefore seems 
that at its philosophical beginnings western thinking had the potential to become culturally 
sensitive. Socrates agreed with the sophist’s belief that reality was subjective, but introduced 
the idea that by carefully reflecting on ones experiences you get around the subjectivity 
problem and find some concepts that were stable and knowable (Hergenhahn, 2005). Socrates 
laid the groundwork for another highly influential western thinker, Plato. 
 
PLATO (427-347 BC) 
 
Plato was one of Socrates students, whose influence on modern western thinking is referred 
to by Whitehead (cited in Leahey, 2000, p. 81) as follows: “The safest general 
characterisation of the whole western philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of 
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footnotes to Plato”. Plato’s aim was to find the eternal reality underlying everything, in what 
could be an early form of reductionist thinking. He took Socrates ideas further, but claimed 
that “ideas” or “forms” were the ultimate reality, had an independent existence and could be 
known only by reason (Hergenhahn, 2005). Plato used the analogy of The Cave to explain his 
reasoning. Objects outside the cave cast shadows on the inside, which an observer can see. 
These shadows are likened to our senses and how they capture an “image” of reality. The 
actual objects that are outside the cave beyond our sight are the “forms” or objective reality 
(Hothersall, 1995). If we follow Plato’s reasoning then the culture, epistemology and 
experiences of the observer invariably influence their perception of reality and no one 
perception can be more or less plausible. How can western psychology, as one perception of 
reality, then be seen as superior to indigenous “psychology”? Plato however believed, as so 
often does modern western science, that this problem of subjectivity could be overcome by 
using certain techniques that would reveal “truth”. This is very reminiscent of the tension 
between positivism and post-modernism today. Plato concluded that sensory experience 
breeds ignorance and should be avoided in favour of reasoned, deductive introspection and 
geometrical measurements. This reasoning created the context in which Plato formulated his 
ideas on the soul or psyche. 
Plato revisited the concept of a mind and body dualism as proposed by Pythagoras. He argued 
that the soul or psyche existed in a realm of pure knowledge before being implanted in human 
beings; thus if you engaged in introspection you could retrieve that native or inborn 
knowledge. This is known as Plato’s reminiscence theory of knowledge (Hothersall, 1995). 
Part of this knowledge that could be retrieved was that of geometry, which Plato saw as true 
knowledge of the “forms” created by God.  Plato argued that due to the perfect mind or 
psyche’s origin in a realm of purity, and separation from the evil body, it could live on in 
perfect form again after bodily death (Jordaan & Jordaan, 1998). This of course further 
solidified the notion of a mind or (soul) and body dualism and started a shift towards a 
broader immortal conception of the soul or psyche.   
Plato, working from ancient Greek principles, described the soul or psyche’s constitution as 
being similar to that of a nation state in his writing The Republic. Malone, (2009) notes the 
striking similarities between Freud’s Psychodynamic theory and Plato’s theory of soul or 
personality. Plato spoke of the soul having rational, spirited and appetitive components, much 
like Freud’s Id, Ego and Superego. These components governed the individual in the same 
hierarchical way as a nation state. Psyche or soul, adjustment existed when there was a 
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balance between the three components. Two millennia after Plato, Freud “fathered” modern 
western psychology on very similar principles, yet spoke of the “mind”, a more acceptable 
term by that time. Plato was often accused of plagiarism from the ancients, which is 
interesting given that Freud was often accused of simply adapting Plato’s work (Malone, 
2009). In our opinion they were both simply capturing fragmented ideas out of their broader 
contexts and ordering them in coherent ways.  If however, as Freud claimed, his work was 
completely original, then perhaps he succeeded in rediscovering an ancient idea and we see 
western thinking going through a repeated cycle of reasoning. Either way western psychology 
cannot easily be separated from western philosophy. Furthermore modern western thinking 
and epistemology has ancient roots that continue to impact on its adherents in similar ways 
today, both enabling and limiting understandings of our lived experiences. 
We also feel that Plato’s rejection of epistemology is significant, as it reflects a modern 
dilemma where western thinking is frequently purported to be universally applicable, 
culturally transcendent and better able to reflect “truth” Baloyi (2008) and Mkhize (2004). 
The irony is that in rejecting epistemology, Plato also rejected his own thinking and 
existence. The fact thus remains that western psychology is the product of a particular 
epistemological framework and only reflects “truth” within the corresponding limitations of 
that orientation. Plato’s work inspired many of his students to further his ideas, including one 
of the most influential western thinkers of the time, Aristotle.  
 
ARISTOTLE (384-322 BC) 
 
Aristotle was the first western philosopher who extensively investigated themes recognisable 
as the subject matter of western psychology, such as memory, sensation, dreams, geriatrics 
and learning (Hergenhahn, 2005). His book De Anima (On the soul) is generally seen as the 
first written psychology in the west. Brysbaert and Rastle, (2009) note that De Anima became 
central in teachings on western psychology from the renaissance, well into the eighteenth 
century, initially leading to tensions with the Roman Catholic Church, likely due to its 
notions on the soul. Like Plato, Aristotle believed that there was an underlying “truth” to 
everything. Unlike Plato, he felt that the most appropriate way to know these “truths” was not 
introspection, but was instead the study of nature. Aristotle’s approach to the soul was 
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distinctly biological, influenced in particular by his observations of plants and molluscs 
(Munger, 2003). Aristotle (cited in Leahey, 2000, p. 84) describes the soul as, “the form of a 
natural body having life potentially in it”. He believed, as is often the case in most modern 
western science, that if you investigate a phenomenon frequently and systematically you will 
eventually discover its essence. 
For Aristotle the psyche or soul was that which gives life and accordingly any living thing 
must therefore posses a soul. Leahey (2000, p. 84) clarifies this by saying that for Aristotle, 
“All living things possess soul as their form, and thus it is a living thing’s soul that defines its 
nature, what it is to be that living thing. Soul is the actuality and the actualizing, directing 
force of any living organism, fulfilling the body’s potential having of life”. We argue that this 
is a description of life experienced in its totality or existential reality, as influenced by 
internal and external contexts. This is reminiscent of Carl Rogers formulation of experiential 
reality where, “The organism reacts to the field as it is experienced and perceived (based on 
culture, epistemology etc.), this perceptual field is, for the individual reality” (Rogers, 1987, 
p. 484). In other words Aristotle speaks of the soul as an actualising force, and Rogers speaks 
of the mind as the actualising force, revealing yet again the overlap between western 
psychology and philosophy. Our understanding then of Aristotle’s conceptualisation of soul 
or psyche is that it enables this actualising ability and that it is shaped by our unique 
experiences. The soul or psyche must then reflect the very essence of what it is to be a living, 
breathing, feeling human being. 
Aristotle further argued that there were three types of soul or psyche, and the one which a 
living thing had would determine its potential or purpose (Hergenhahn, 2005). The first was a 
vegetative (nutritive) soul as found in plants that allows growth, taking in of sustenance and 
basic reproduction. The second was a sensitive soul, found in animals, allowing animals to 
respond to environmental stimuli and experience sensations, like pain or have memories. The 
third and final soul was that found in human beings, a rational soul, which allowed humans 
to not only have all the functions of the previous two souls but also the ability to think or be 
rational. Thus for Aristotle to be human, was to be rational. The impact of this western focus 
on rationality was evident during the later European colonisation of the world. When 
colonisers encountered indigenous people they were seen as “irrational” and accordingly non-
human. 
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Aristotle, unlike Plato was a monist, arguing that the soul gives living organisms distinctive 
properties; hence any questioning about a mind and body dualism was futile. Barnes (cited in 
Hergenhahn, 2005, p. 47) argues as follows, “We can dismiss as unnecessary the question 
whether the soul and the body are one: it is as though we were to ask whether the wax and its 
shape (a candle) are one”. Barnes captures Aristotle’s argument succinctly in this metaphor 
and perhaps the essence of a debate that to this day serves to fuel heated debate in the 
discipline of western psychology, especially when epistemologically, ontologically and 
methodologically insensitive attempts are made to impose western psychology cross 
culturally. 
If we consider the subject matter and approach employed by Aristotle; an intriguing question 
arises, was Aristotle a “psychologist”? Brock (2006, p. 237) argues that, “applying labels to 
distant historical figures may have the advantage of providing western psychology with 
distinguished ancestors, but it seems to involve a “presentism” of the worst kind: that is a 
projection of views from the present onto the past”. We feel that this critique is valid, but 
only if it is framed in terms of our current definition of a “psychologist” or in terms of a 
western scientific discipline that emerged in the mid nineteenth century. An example should 
clarify our argument. Let’s consider the role of traditional healers in South Africa or 
specifically sangoma’s, who in recent years have been recognised by the Health Professions 
Council and have received “scientific” recognition, albeit in terms of a western conception of 
legitimacy. How is it that these healers were called sangoma before and after their inclusion 
in the HPCSA, yet Aristotle and various other western philosophers of “the mind”, cannot be 
called psychologists, because the formal discipline of psychology was as yet non-existent. 
However later philosophical thinkers such as Freud, who as we have established developed 
work remarkably similar to that of Plato, is called a psychologist? If the separation between 
philosophy and psychology is as faulty as we have argued in this study, then surely Aristotle 
was in essence a psychologist. We should not forget that western psychology evolved out of 
western philosophy. Irrespective of the label we choose for Aristotle his contributions and 
those of other Greek philosophers were significant, they also coincided with a turning point 
in western history and the beginning of the end for the classical era. 
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IMPACT OF THE CLASSICAL ERA ON WESTERN CULTURE AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
The classical world, and in particular Greek thinking, had a profound impact on early western 
culture, science and the understanding of “psychology” that followed. Hergenhahn (2005, p. 
51), referring to the famous western scientific philosopher Popper, argues that, “science 
began when humans first questioned the stories they were told about themselves and the 
world”; the idea being that, more accurate “stories” could be produced. This is of course 
assuming that one story can ever be more accurate than another. From a social constructionist 
perspective this is highly doubtful, as any description of experiential reality is considered 
relative within this framework. Furthermore, Popper’s argument that science is the act of 
humans questioning their oral, written or other heritage is a highly problematic 
universalization, especially in the western psychology context, because of its implications for 
that which is viewed as “scientific”. If we allow ourselves to remain sensitive to the fact that 
what is seen as “scientific” varies from one culture to the next, then it is critical that we 
reframe statements such as those by Popper as being limited in generalizability to a western 
context. Stated differently Popper’s statement is valid provided it is not seen as a universal 
claim to what constitutes “science”. Thus if we amend Poppers statement, we might say, 
“western science began when the Greek philosophers began questioning the stories they were 
told about themselves and the world”, hence the significance of Greek thinking on western 
science, culture and epistemology. In this form Popper effectively sums up the contribution 
of the classical world to current western thinking. 
In addition to questioning their epistemological and ontological understandings, the Greeks 
also modelled the idea of open, critical discussions or a dialogue between people who hold 
different perspectives and ideas. In the context of this study and our call for an open, equal 
dialogical engagement between western and indigenous “psychology” this is an important 
historical tradition, which at the level of epistemology has been disregarded. It is not 
sufficient to have dialogues within western psychology alone, but rather between 
“psychologies”. If the western scientific community is to remain true to its ancient roots, then 
such a dialogical platform is an imperative. Popper (cited in Hergenhahn, 2005, p. 52) 
comments on this Greek Tradition as follows, “…it broke with the dogmatic tradition that 
permitted only one true doctrine and allowed a plurality of doctrines”.  
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Perhaps the most significant realisation that emerges from investigating the role of the 
ancient Greeks in creating western psychology is that modern westerners share a similar 
worldview or epistemology with them. In fact many European languages as currently spoken 
are Greek and Latin derivatives (Hothersall, 1995). The implications of this are significant, as 
all western theories of “psychology” conform to this worldview, and cannot be generalised 
beyond adherents of western cultures. Hothersall (1995, p. 31) corroborates this argument 
noting how ancient Greek thinking informs and limits the efforts of modern western science 
in stating that, “Aristotle’s inductive method and Plato’s deductive approach are basic to 
modern science” The very fact that contemporary psychologists are still grappling with 
concepts familiar to the ancient Greeks and in similar ways is evidence of just how similar 
the ancient and modern western epistemologies really are. Western thinking cannot transcend 
itself, and in the context of theorising on the “mind” or any other existential matter, cannot 
make universal claims.      
As is evident from the preceding discussion, there were constant disagreements surrounding 
the notion of a mind and body dualism vs. monism in ancient Greece and how to understand 
the soul or psyche. This debate would resurface many times throughout western history and is 
still salient in multicultural contexts today. The early Greek philosophers established a 
critical tradition that laid the groundwork for the development of western science, including 
the discipline of psychology. Hergenhahn, (2005) notes that this “Golden Age” of 300 years 
of Greek philosophy, ended at around the same time as Aristotle’s death in 322 B.C. and that 
it was only many centuries later during the renaissance that the critical tradition would be 
rediscovered and revived.  
 
THE MIDDLE OR DARK AGES AND THE CONCEPT OF ONE REALITY 
 
After Aristotle’s death Greece was invaded by the expanding Roman Empire, resulting in 
great hardships and times of strife. Complex abstract philosophy gave way to concern over 
everyday living and what constituted a good life. The resulting philosophies of the Skeptics, 
Cynics, Epicureans and Stoics dedicated little systematic effort to questions of the soul or 
mind. Jordaan and Jordaan, (1998) refer to the middle or dark ages as a latent period in the 
development of western psychology and while many ideas were proposed regarding mind, 
soul and body, few were done in systematic ways. Over time these moral philosophies, which 
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were frequently contradictory, gave way to a focus on religion. Westerners of the early 
middle ages initially adhered to a form of Neo-Platonism, which saw a person as having a 
material body and separate spiritual soul (O’Boyle, 2006). The world itself was viewed as an 
inferior copy of a perfect spiritual realm. The body was seen as nothing more than a 
temporary home for the soul, which travels to the spiritual realm after death. This version of 
Plato’s original ideas mixed with emergent Christianity and various other influences was 
abandoned for, and replaced by, formalised Christianity in 313 A.D, when St. Paul claimed 
that Jesus was the son of God and Christianity was the one true religion. Emperor 
Constantine made Christianity tolerable in the Roman Empire and helped transform the 
various fragmented versions of Christianity into a standard set of beliefs (Hergenhahn, 2005). 
This act established the Roman Catholic Church, whose dominance and rigid dogmatic 
approach ensured that the enlightened inquiring spirit of the classical era was lost (Jordaan & 
Jordaan, 1998). Hergenhahn, (2005, p. 86) states that, “The church had absolute power, and 
any dissention was dealt with harshly. Clearly the spirit of the times was not conducive to 
open, objective inquiry”. Brysbaert and Rastle, (2009, p. 25) point out that, “The main factor 
that is quoted for the decline of scientific advancement in Western Europe is the emergence 
and eventual dominance of Christian religion”. In this context questions probing human 
nature were not seen as relevant, because it was assumed that human beings were simply 
Gods creation and thus had a clearly defined place within the hierarchy of existence. O’ 
Boyle (2006, p. 55) comments on this hierarchy and relates it to the western Christian soul as 
follows: “Placing a transcendent and divine soul in man makes him qualitatively different 
from and superior to all other animals. This idea (continues) to influence western perspectives 
about the relationships between humans and nature, between humans and nonhuman animals, 
between males and females, (etc.)”. It was during this time period that the first Christian 
philosopher of the early Middle Ages St. Augustine made his contribution to the western 
understanding of the soul. 
 
ST.AUGUSTINE (354-430 A.D) 
 
Augustine like other early theologian’s had the goal of promoting the growth of Christianity 
and combining its various divergent forms into a single coherent faith. These ideas are 
significant with regards to western psychology, in that they shaped the epistemology of the 
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west for the next 1000 years and corresponding notions surrounding the soul, body, and 
mind. In fact one could go as far as to argue that Christianity itself became a worldview, with 
profound consequences for the later development of western psychology. (O’Boyle, 2006, p. 
54) notes that, “Many of the assumptions made in the western world about thoughts, feelings 
and behaviours are based on early Christian doctrines”. Augustine advocated a Christian 
ontology; where God is understood to have created everything and placed humans at the 
epicentre of all creation. Furthermore Augustine argued that the Greek love of research in the 
classical era was a waste of time and nothing more than human speculation and conjecture. 
He felt that the “Greek discoveries” were mere opinion and brought people no closer to 
certain knowledge. Augustine (cited in O’Boyle, 2006, p. 52) argues as follows: “For the 
Christian it is enough to believe that the cause of all created things, in heaven or on earth, 
whether visible or invisible, is none other than the goodness of the creator, who is the one and 
true God”. While we agree with Augustine that knowledge can never be certain, it somehow 
did not occur to him that Christian knowledge was equally uncertain. It was this absolute 
belief in the superiority of Christianity and its related ideals of converting the people of the 
world to its dogma, that in our opinion drove western culture to impose itself globally as 
“the” epistemology, rather than “an” epistemology.  
Having established the dogmatic context in which St. Augustine was operating, we can turn 
to his notions on the triad of mind, body and soul. Leahey, (2000, p. 103) argues that, 
“Augustine wanted only to know God and the soul, and he used faith to justify his belief”. In 
other words all people needed to know about the physical world was that God had created it. 
Augustine also had no desire to undermine the dominant religious framework and worked 
well within its limits. At this time in western history people had moved away from a focus on 
the observable world, with all its pain and strife and turned their attention to heaven and the 
soul. To know the soul, was to know God and this was regarded as the ultimate form of 
knowledge.  Augustine, like others of the time, believed that the soul could be known only by 
way of introspection, in the form of meditation. It is in this way that one could access divine 
“illumination” from God. The soul was thus a representation of God within the person. Thus 
introspection was not an attempt to study anything or understand oneself; it was a way to 
access God. Leahey, (2000, p. 103) argues that, “The medieval thinker did not want to 
understand the mind or the world in its own terms, but only as clues to the invisible reality of 
God in heaven. Science and philosophy as…the Greeks knew them (were) impossible in such 
a context”.  
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For Augustine the spiritual human soul was part of the divine and the material human body 
was part of nature. The body seeks to do evil, but can be mediated by the soul to do good 
deeds. People who lived a good pure life would be rewarded with an afterlife and have 
internal feelings of virtue, while evildoers would suffer from guilt (O’Boyle, 2006). God 
could speak to individuals through their soul, but individuals could choose not to listen. Thus 
the soul both enabled good and evil, providing a sort of battleground for the opposing forces 
within the individual (Hergenhahn, 2005). The importance here is the introduction of thinking 
about consciousness, or the conscious ability to choose between right and wrong. 
Accordingly the immortal spiritual soul had a conscious mortal component called mind, 
which linked to earthly life. This additional fragmentation of the human being was 
particularly significant for future developments in western psychology, because the idea of a 
unique personal consciousness, would lead to the notion of the self (Jordaan & Jordaan, 
1998). It would also lead to idea that in order to study soul, psyche and mind, one would need 
to focus on consciousness. The concept of a unique mind departed significantly from the 
work of philosophers like Plato, who saw psyche or “mind” in a very broad ontological sense. 
Augustine had thus essentially succeeded in splitting the soul into spirit and mind, in duality 
with body. 
This sort of thinking did not go without opposition however, opponents such as Thomas 
Aquinas; who initially tried to revive Aristotle’s monism, were labelled as heretics and 
effectively silenced by the church. The reason being that Aquinas’s ideas meant that mind 
depended on body and vice versa for existence, much like a modern strictly neurobiological 
view, accordingly when you died so did your “consciousness”. This was deemed 
unacceptable by the Roman Catholic Church (Jordaan & Jordaan, 1998). Aquinas in line with 
his theological beliefs and in line with Christian belief reworked his ideas and argued that 
mind also had to be immortal, because it was part of the soul. This helped cement a new 
version of Plato’s essential and religiously necessary dualism in place. Aquinas then turned 
his attention to arguing for the validity of reason, as a way to know God and the soul. 
Hergenhahn, (2005) argues that Augustine along with scholastic thinkers such as Aquinas, in 
time succeeded in convincing the church, that reason and faith were both legitimate ways of 
knowing God and the soul. O’Boyle, (2006, p. 71) points out that, “In the late 13th century, 
the study of nature through observation was sanctioned by the church, but only because 
nature revealed the supernatural”. Aquinas thus managed to find a way to reconcile reason 
with religious belief, inadvertently contributing to the creation of a context which saw a 
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decline in church authority. This in conjunction with phenomena such as the Black Death 
(Bubonic plague), where Christians and non-believers died in equal numbers, gradually 
created cracks in the foundations of faith and helped bring about the Renaissance. This period 
would see a major shift in western epistemology and the start of modern western science and 
philosophy.   
 
THE RENAISSANCE 
 
The Renaissance (1450-1600 A.D) ushered in a new era that saw further advances in areas 
such as art, science, philosophy, anatomy and astronomy. There was a return to the open 
minded inquiry of early Greek philosophy. The focus went from God centred, to human 
centred, with an emphasis on the world in which western people lived (Hergenhahn, 2005). 
Under the guidance of the Italian poet and scholar Francesco Petrarch a new western 
discipline known as the humanities (Studia Humanitatis) was established, which had an 
emphasis on human dignity and glorifying of intellect (Jordaan & Jordaan, 1998). This 
reflected a broader cultural movement called Humanism and the spirit of the times. 
Humanism was of course not a western invention and is similar to the African way of being, 
as seen in the philosophy of ubuntu. O’Boyle (2006) calls humanism a shift from interest in 
the afterlife to a focus on the present; there was an intense curiosity about immediate human 
experience. As people were released from the restrictions of the middle ages they began to 
focus on being autonomous individuals, aware of the self as conscious, with an independent 
mind and will (Jordaan & Jordaan, 1998). With the renewed focus on science and desire for 
the objective study of phenomena, including human beings, the problem of how to study the 
soul or mind became once more salient. Perhaps the best known contributor to this area of 
inquiry from the time was the French mathematician, philosopher and scientist, Rene 
Descartes (1596-1650 A.D). Leahey (2000) notes that for better or worse western 
“psychology” as we know it began with Descartes.  
Descartes was driven by the desire to unify science and find truth, by using the “power” of 
reason (Hothersall, 1995). Clearly Descartes had an emphasis on what came to be known as 
rationalism, which throughout the evolution of western thinking had become increasingly 
central, to western science and subsequently western psychology. Bateson (cited in Lubin & 
O’ Connor, 1989) for example, notes that during times of crises or during large scale problem 
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solving in the west, there is a tendency to accept the solution that offers certainty, which is 
based on “rationally sound” thinking. Approaches that are ambiguous and do not offer quick 
fixes are viewed with suspicion. It is important to mention the belief in these notions of truth, 
rationality and logic as revealed by the contributors to western psychology, like Descartes. 
Today in western psychology there is still a tendency to view the knowledge products of 
indigenous “psychologies” globally, with the same suspicion because they do not use 
“rational approaches” to understanding their experiential realities. Bateson (cited in Lubin & 
O’ Connor, 1989) gives an example of this scepticism, when discussing the initial 
introduction of cybernetic thinking into western psychology. Westerners were accustomed to 
linear approaches and were discomforted by the implications of cybernetic thinking. 
“Psychological” knowledge that conforms to the western epistemological underpinnings is 
consistently seen as better and more appropriate, while indigenous “psychology” rooted in 
completely different epistemological frameworks is viewed with suspicion. Descartes desire 
for truth and reason therefore are typical of a western epistemology and his work on issues 
surrounding the soul or mind inevitably reflects this. 
Descartes had an obsession with truth and finding objective ways to know it. This resulted in 
his own existential dilemma (Hothersall, 1995). He questioned the very existence of the 
world, and even himself. He eventually resolved this by concluding that the only thing he was 
certain of was that at a given moment in time, he was thinking about something, hence the 
famous, I think, therefore I am. Or put differently humans can think about their thinking. 
Descartes was thus convinced that by the fact that he was thinking, he must exist. Descartes 
had also proven rationally that something, beyond empirically observable matter, did exist, 
the soul or more specifically the mind. Hothersall, (1995, p. 47) notes then that if this is the 
case an inevitable problem arises, “If thinking is the final proof of our existence, it is 
important to know how and why we think”. Descartes now faced the problem of how to study 
the mind objectively. According to Jordaan and Jordaan (1998, p. 8), “Descartes’s solution 
was to make a clear distinction between the immortal, religious soul and the ephemeral mind 
(the thinking part of the soul)”. Descartes’s original formulation, (cited in O’Boyle, 2006, p. 
106) lays out the following argument, 
 
“Thus because probably men in the earliest times did not distinguish in us that 
principle in virtue of which we are nourished, grow, and perform all those operations 
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which are common to us with the brutes (animals) apart from any thought,…they 
called both by the single name soul. But I, perceiving that the principle by which we 
are nourished is wholly distinct from that by means of which we think, have declared 
that the name soul when used for both is equivocal (unclear/ambiguous); and I say 
that, when soul is taken to mean the primary actuality or chief essence of man, it must 
be understood to apply only to the principle by which we think, and I have called it by 
the name mind as often as possible in order to avoid ambiguity; for I consider the 
mind as not as part of the soul but as the whole of the soul which thinks”.   
 
Descartes claimed that humans have a thinking mind which is an aspect or function of the 
soul, which lacks substance, unlike the body, which is limited, but has substance (Hothersall, 
1995). This is a very distinct dualism, where the body is essentially mechanical, or a complex 
machine and can run many functions on its own such as digestion or respiration. He used the 
mechanisms of clocks as an analogy for how the body works and concluded that the human 
body was an incredibly complex machine, because it was created by God. The mind could 
also control some of the body and it was possession of a thinking mind or soul that could be 
aware of its self, which separated humans, from animals, which functioned predominantly 
mechanically. Animals could not think about their thinking and thus did not possess souls. 
Put differently the soul enabled higher order thinking. Descartes then faced the problem of 
explaining how the immaterial mind could influence the body and vice versa. The interaction 
of mind and body in humans according to Descartes, took place in the pineal gland. Descartes 
chose this structure as it was the only unitary brain structure he could isolate, so it seemed to 
fit with his ideas (Hothersall, 1995).  
Descartes therefore used the term “soul”, in much the same way as we use the term mind in 
contemporary western psychology today. For Descartes however it also meant the functions 
of the brain in what we might see as neurobiological functioning today. He saw the mind as a 
representation of the soul. One need only consider the title of his book, The passions of the 
soul to clarify his understanding of “mind”. As far as ideas within the mind or thinking soul, 
Descartes identified inborn ideas, independent of experience, such as self, God, time and 
motion, as well as experience dependent ideas, which included memories (Gentile and Miller, 
2009). This of course is similar to current approaches focusing on a nature vs. nurture 
orientation. Emotions or Passions, unlike ideas arose from within the body and were 
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passively interpreted by the mind. This also brought about an additional important distinction 
for Descartes between humans and animals. Animals do not posses a soul and hence do not 
have language, self awareness or emotions, Descartes used this to further his argument for a 
mind and body dualism.   
Descartes had a significant impact on the philosophy, which led to the discipline of western 
psychology, by advocating what became known as a Cartesian dualism. This allowed for the 
construction of a model and paradigm, where the body and mind can function independently 
according to different laws or principles. Equally evident from Descartes’s work is the 
progression towards a definition of “mind” or “thinking soul” that encompasses subject 
matter familiar to contemporary western psychologists. Descartes view of the soul; of which 
mind is a function, as immortal, made his conclusions similar to those of Thomas Aquinas in 
the Dark Ages. The difference is that he used reason to come to this understanding. O’Boyle 
(2006, p. 104) confirms this noting that, “Echoing Aquinas but using logical deduction to 
arrive at the same conclusion, Descartes argues that because God exists, is perfect, and would 
not deceive us, sensory experiences can usually be trusted. Even so sensory experiences must 
be clearly represented in consciousness to be considered certain…any discrepancy…should 
be resolved in favour of reason”. The fundamental consequence of this for the discipline of 
western psychology as practiced today, was the supposed realisation that truth about 
“psychological” phenomena need not be observable or measurable, in order to be established 
rationally (O’Boyle, 2006). 
The on-going fragmentation the human being for the purposes of objective study may have 
solved the issue of opening up an invisible aspect of human beings to scientific inquiry, while 
not affronting Christian beliefs, but also created new problems by laying the foundations for a 
discipline that would be highly specific to western culture. O’ Boyle (2006, p. 106) also notes 
that from this point onwards, “the term mind is considered more appropriate than the term 
soul, when discussing psychological questions”. In other words the term psyche was now 
firmly linked to the notion of mind, rather than soul. Descartes had effectively “discovered” 
the modern western consciousness or “mind”. Leahey (2000, pp. 149-156) sums up  
Descartes’s contribution by warning that, “ The problems for Descartes’s psychology, and 
therefore all later (western) psychologists, begin when we turn to the human soul, which 
Descartes as a Christian had to exempt from mechanistic explanation. Descartes’s account is 
usually presented as clean and simple, but it is in fact slippery and illusive, a tortured attempt 
 33 
 
to preserve a Christian soul in a mechanistic universe...it appears Descartes dug a hole from 
which (western) psychology is only now escaping”.   
 
WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY: THE EMERGENT SCIENCE OF THE “MIND” 
 
For some 200 years after Descartes, western psychology remained a subsection of 
philosophy, until a revival of the sciences in the mid 19th century. New discoveries, in 
particular with regards to the human nervous system fostered a renewed interest in the 
Cartesian dualism as proposed by Descartes (Jordaan & Jordaan, 1998).  The idea that people 
could be objectively studied like natural phenomena became completely entrenched and the 
same methods developed for explaining the physical sciences were applied to human beings, 
based on this dualistic view of mind and body. Western psychology as the philosophical 
study of the soul was effectively a thing of the past, replaced by the science of the “mind”. 
This new science kept the name “psychology”, which paved the way for many problems and 
a great deal of confusion in the future. In 1879 Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920 A.D) set up an 
experimental “psychology” laboratory in Leipzig, Germany and brought about what is 
generally seen as the formal beginning of western psychology as an independent science. 
From this time on various schools of western psychology developed including, structuralism, 
functionalism, behaviourism, Gestalt psychology and psychoanalysis. In terms of 
developments in the western conception of “mind”, the most noteworthy contributor of this 
period was Sigmund Freud (1870-1930 A.D) the “father” of modern western psychology. 
Freud’s primary contribution in terms of the western conception of mind, psyche and 
psychology, within the context of this study, was the introduction of subconscious and 
unconscious aspects of the mind. In other words Freud took the mind, fragmented from the 
soul, in a Cartesian dualism, and then fragmented the mind, into conscious and unconscious 
aspects. According to Jordaan and Jordaan, (1998) the basic premise for Freud was that the 
mind, had an unconscious component, which was the primary determinant of human 
behaviour. Freud focused on how to gain access to this “unconscious” mind, for example, 
through dream analysis. He felt that his patients would be better able to manage their lives, if 
they were not driven by unconscious “psychic” drives. Freud thus developed psychoanalysis 
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as a therapeutic means for brining unconscious material, into consciousness. This laid the 
groundwork for the “talking cure” or psychotherapy as practiced today. 
Since Freud’s time, the western understanding of psychology and the “mind” has grown 
considerably. The problems of a mind and body dualism in the west are generally considered 
to have been resolved. Body is understood in terms of brain and mind in terms of 
consciousness. Mind then is a function of the brains electro-chemical activity. Jordaan and 
Jordaan (1998) argue that this is very much like the relationship between hardware and 
software in a computer. Jordaan and Jordaan do however point out that this “solution” is not 
without its critics. So even though the issue of duality of mind and body is generally seen as 
having been resolved, this may not be entirely true. As indigenous “psychologies” find their 
feet and voice there is no doubt that questions will emerge regarding the place for a soul or 
spirit in this modern western ontological solution. Even the validity of the notion “mind” is 
called into question when working cross culturally. 
 
CURRENT EXAMPLES OF WESTERN TERMINOLOGY 
 
Having considered the evolution of western conceptions of body, soul and mind we can turn 
to current western definitions of these concepts. The influence of western history, culture and 
epistemology is abundantly clear in these definitions making it impossible to apply them 
universally to all human beings. 
The Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary of current English (OALD) (Hornby, 2000, 
p.745) for example defines the “mind” as the part of a person that makes them able to think 
and to feel; the conscious and subconscious mind. It also defines mind as the ability to think 
and reason; your intelligence; the particular way somebody thinks or their intellect. Here we 
see the influence of Rene Descartes in terms of his conceptualisation of “mind”, Sigmund 
Freud and the idea of an unconscious and the western “rational” logical way of thinking that 
stretches as far back as ancient Greece. 
The OALD (Hornby, 2000, p. 1136) defines “soul” as the spiritual part of a person, believed 
to exist after death, the immortal soul. But it can also refer to a person’s inner character, 
containing their true thoughts and feelings. Finally it can refer to the moral and spiritual 
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qualities of humans in general, for example the dark side of the human soul. Here we 
arguably can see the influence of Christianity and the immortal religious soul, or a reference 
to deeper unconscious aspects of the mind, again reminiscent of Freud and finally links to the 
moral philosophies of the middle ages. 
The OALD (Hornby, 2000, p. 1147) defines “spirit” as the part of the person that includes the 
mind, feelings and character or even as the soul as defined above. With spirit the possible 
difficulty of reconciling the above notions within a Christian framework becomes evident. In 
order for the holy spirit of Christian religion to have a place with mind and soul it must either 
house these notions or be equated to being one of them. 
The importance of showing the influence of western history on the definition or 
understanding of these terms is threefold. First it raises epistemological awareness of the fact 
that the western constructions of mind, spirit, soul and self are impossible to detach from a 
western epistemology itself. Second it should be clear that non-western cultures, which have 
their own history, culture and epistemology, will have their own constructions, theories and 
terminology, equally dependant on their culture and history. Finally it should then also be 
clear that applying constructs of one culture directly to another is impossible. Every culture is 
more than capable of theorising about their ontological and epistemological realities in their 
own unique ways. Therefore any imposition of the imperialist western culture constitutes a 
moral injustice.  
With such clarity established we must consider the introduction of western psychology to 
Africa and specifically South Africa. 
  
“PSYCHOLOGY” COLONISES THE DARK CONTINENT 
 
“Historians of Psychology had hardly started to inquire into the shaping of the 
discipline and profession in its Euro-American home countries when Psychology 
expanded rapidly outward, to Asia, Latin America and Africa.”   
                                                                                                   (Staeuble, 2006, p. 183) 
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Western psychology as it stands today is an import to Africa, a construction of the west, 
formed within the limits of a particular epistemology and imposed as universally applicable, 
in the form of a “science”. Western psychology can neither be disconnected from its colonial 
past nor from its contribution as a cultural imperialist. Bulhan (cited in Jordaan & Jordaan, 
1998) argues that “psychological” research on the African continent has served the needs of 
the coloniser and seldom shown a real interest in Africans. Bulhan goes on to note the 
failures of western psychology, with regard to explicating the African “psyche”, due to a 
misfit of western frameworks, when used for understanding the African experience. He 
further notes the tendency of “westernising” African research and cites the work of Leonard 
Doob, who claims that western psychology contributes to the “civilising” of Africans into 
western epistemologies. Bulhan concludes that the development of a scientific Afrocentric 
“psychology” will require a creative process, which will be capable of capturing the African 
experience as it emerges from living reality, social relations, history, and material 
circumstances. 
Jordaan and Jordaan (1998, p. 19) point out that the situation in South Africa reflects this by 
stating that, “The development of psychology in South Africa can be related…to typical 
colonisation patterns all over the world: a Euro-American body of psychological knowledge 
and expertise was imported without any real attempts to link it up with the indigenous folk 
psychology of ancient Africa”. Holdstock (cited in Jordaan & Jordaan) furthers this argument 
by saying, “like the missionaries of old, we are trying to convert Africa to psychological 
reasoning along the lines of western thought, and by doing so we naturally fail to 
acknowledge the “psychological” dimension of Africa”.  
Mackenzie and Seedat (2008) argue that the development of “psychology” in South Africa 
was a triangulated process, which involves a legacy of race, scientific racism and 
professionalism. “Psychology” in South Africa, within this triad represents a continuation of 
the dominance by western psychology. The primary function of western scientific psychology 
was thus initially to further the agenda of the colonisers, in terms of converting the colonised 
to western civilization, and in due course to support and help justify apartheid. Mckenzie and 
Seedat (2008, pp. 86-87) note that this was part of a broader global process where, 
“Psychology offered rationalisations for the oppression of black people the world over, and 
helped to transform the mission of social science into an enterprise of acculturation, conquest 
and conversion”. 
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The early 1980s saw a gradual shift in western psychology, as applied in South Africa 
(Mackenzie & Seedat, 2008). The various changes, in line with political developments saw 
the establishment of democratic inclusive professional associations, such as PsySSA. 
Indigenous people were thus afforded access to western psychological services, without 
adequate recognition of their own “psychology”. Professional societies like PsySSA continue 
to operate predominantly within a western epistemology, meaning that psychology in South 
Africa continues to reflect the experiences of the west. Western psychology’s dominant 
position in the “psychology” landscape drives its misguided policy of inclusion and tolerance 
of indigenous “psychology”, without considering the fact that indigenous “psychology” 
should be able to exist in its own right, and not as a subdivision of western psychology. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As is evident from the above account, the western understandings of mind, soul, psyche and 
psychology, cannot possibly be disconnected from western history, experience, culture and 
epistemology. Western psychology, as a construction of the west, has imposed itself both 
globally and in a South African context, effectively silencing and minimising the position of 
indigenous “psychologies”. To position indigenous “psychologies” as a subdivision of 
western psychology, by way of selective inclusion thus amounts to faulty thinking and a 
moral injustice. Furthermore it serves to maintain an unsustainable position of dominance and 
control of the “psychology” landscape by the west. 
The evolution of western psychology is filled with disagreement, fragmentation and 
contradiction, with repeated subjugation of knowledge systems by dominant hegemonies, 
such as Christianity, science, and politics. There is no moral or ethical basis for allowing 
western psychology to function in isolation, as if indigenous “psychology” does not exist or 
have anything of value to offer. The very history of western psychology itself and its 
imposition in South Africa, should prompt investigation into what “psychology” is, should 
be, and can be in the future, for all South Africans.     
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CHAPTER 3 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This work stinks of fiction! 
This work stinks of fiction,                                                                                                             
were used to our restriction.                                                                                                              
Frameworks of illusion,                                                                                                                           
feeding the delusion!                                                                                                                  
Domination feels right,                                                                                                                     
powerful and uptight.                                                                                                                        
Follow leaders like sheep!                                                                                                                  
Human beings so cheap? 
This work stinks of fiction,                                                                                                  
inaccurate in its depiction?                                                                                                             
Make one more prediction,                                                                                                                 
engage with your addiction!                                                                                                         
Pathologise the wicked,                                                                                                                      
follow as depicted.                                                                                                                              
Control is so appealing,                                                                                                                      
there’s no need for feeling! 
This work stinks of fiction,                                                                                                                 
conflicts with our decision.                                                                                                               
A challenge is demeaning!                                                                                                                      
Hard work not appealing.                                                                                                                  
Resolute, not destitute,                                                                                                                       
the old evil bears fruit?                                                                                                                         
Even if we have to loot,                                                                                                                       
pillage, steal, then quickly scoot!                                                         (Poem by researcher) 
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In this chapter we argue that “psychology” should be understood in context. In other words 
“psychology” as it occurs within a particular cultural and epistemological framework. We 
start by examining western psychology, as it is currently defined and positioned. It is in this 
context that we question the relevance of western psychology in Africa and specifically South 
Africa. 
In support of our argument that “psychology” should be understood in context, we 
differentiate “psychology” as a western construction, from “psychological” thought itself. We 
argue that psychological thought is the ability to experience, feel, think, theorise and act, as 
expressed within different cultural and epistemological contexts. Western psychology is thus 
merely one such expression. 
On the basis of these understandings, we critically examine “psychology” as a “science” and 
accordingly advocate the expansion of western psychology’s range and methods of inquiry.   
 
CONTEMPLATING WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY IN ITS CURRENT POSITION 
AND DEFINITION 
 
Western psychology, as “the” scientific study of the mind, has in its current form and practice 
laid claim to the “psychology” landscape, making universal, value free and supposedly 
objective claims to knowledge and experience. This colonisation of the worlds “psychology” 
landscape has not however been without criticism and concern. Stevens and Wedding (2004) 
for example question the uncritical global application of western psychology, as well as the 
belief that objectivity can supersede culture and produce universally applicable 
methodologies or approaches. 
Western psychologists frequently claim to be neutral in their pursuit of knowledge, yet this is 
a highly contestable notion. Owusu-Bempah (cited in Holdstock, 2000) for example points 
out the prospering nature of western psychology in Nazi Germany, as a case of “neutral 
science” being manipulated to serve immoral agendas. We don’t have to look far to find 
similar abuses in our own South African history, where under the apartheid regime 
psychologists contributed to the development of a system based on racial segregation. It is 
worth remembering that Hendrik Verwoerd, the father of apartheid, was a psychologist 
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(Louw, cited in Holdstock, 2000). Clearly there is a faulty separation between science and 
politics; if anything the two are reciprocally driven by each other, therefore maintaining a 
value free, objective and neutral stance in western science is not possible. 
Western psychology as practiced in South Africa today, developed within the ideological 
context of colonialism and then apartheid. This is reflected in contributions to the 
“psychology” landscape today, where the psychology or “lived experiences” 
 of the west are still dominant and are given preference, while the indigenous “psychologies”, 
which represent the majority of South Africans lived experiences, are silenced, delegitimised 
by western standards and effectively marginalised to the periphery of the mainstream. 
A further consequence of the belief in objectivity by western psychologists is the faulty 
separation between the act of observation and the effects on the observed phenomenon 
(Stoljar, 2010). Despite the fact that this assumption has repeatedly been proven to be faulty, 
there is still an implicit trust in the positivistic paradigm in western science, including 
psychology. The fundamental problem with this objective, empirical, positivistic approach is 
the lack of epistemological and ecological awareness which it fosters in western 
psychologists. They are thus less aware of the constructed nature of their knowledge and their 
influence on that which they observe. There are of course exceptions; ecosystemic 
practitioners for example, focus on awareness of their own beliefs, assumptions, culture and 
epistemology, and the impact of these on what they observe. Within the ecological 
framework, the dialogical, reciprocal nature of relationships takes centre stage (Moore, 
2003). 
Unfortunately the vast majority of research in western psychology is still conducted within 
empirical, positivistic frameworks, leaving ecological, post-modern approaches to show their 
utility primarily in clinical contexts. Western psychology has consequently lost touch with 
advances in other disciplines, which have in many cases moved beyond classic Newtonian 
approaches, with their focus on distinct phenomena and clear boundaries (Holdstock, 2000). 
Our current global dilemmas, such as global warming reflect the dangers of modernistic, 
Newtonian based western thinking, which frequently fails to see the broader ecological 
impact of its actions. We cannot continue to hide behind notions like objectivity and use these 
beliefs to justify the universal claims of western science and psychology. 
In addition to its universal scientific claims, contemporary western psychology is also 
characterised by disciplinary fragmentation. Crighton and Towl (2008) argue that regressive 
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fragmentation in western psychology fosters a mind-set of separateness, competition, and 
ultimately alienation from broader human concerns. This of course reflects the broader 
western epistemology, which separates the world into distinct, mutually exclusive entities 
that are believed to function independently in linear relationships. The primary problem that 
results from disunity and fragmentation in western psychology is that there is no unifying or 
underlying theme to the discipline. Watkins and Shulman (2008) argue that from the start of 
western psychology there has been disagreement about its appropriate focus, hence the 
numerous divisions and specialisations that constitute the “mainstream”. They further argue 
that as a result of this fragmentation, western psychology has ended up functioning in a void, 
disconnected from the very real conflicts and suffering in our society. With western 
psychology’s steadfast determination to be a “science” it ignores the contributions of people 
who succeed in making interdisciplinary connections and function in innovative, progressive, 
holistic ways. 
Despite the seemingly inevitable focus on rational, systematic “scientific” knowledge, many 
people still express a longing for a “psychology” that can address the central existential 
concerns of their lives (Reed, 1997). These concerns, which include various spiritual and 
metaphysical components, are not addressed appropriately by western psychology in its 
current narrow, fragmented definition. The rich, diverse and incredibly complex nature of 
indigenous African “psychology” for example, cannot be authentically represented in 
separate parts. The links between aesthetic, spiritual, physical, philosophical, anthropological, 
sociological, theological and experiential as understood in the west simply do not apply in 
African contexts. 
Increasing awareness of the faulty separation between western disciplines and paradigms, has 
led many researchers to call for removal of the walls dividing the western knowledge system 
(Eckensberger, (2000). This means that the barriers between art, science, language and many 
more need to be challenged. 
In my own experience I have frequently been criticized for including poetry and other 
creative writings in “scientific” contexts, for using songs and music to relate and share my 
experiences, or using a painting to chart my personal processes and development.         
How are these experiences not psychology? Or more specifically in the context of this study, 
why does western psychology fail to accommodate such experiences? By our understanding 
this is the direct result of the faulty separation between areas of inquiry such as language and 
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art. These separations are strange, given that western psychology for example, can be studied 
at most universities under a Bachelor of Arts or sciences degree. It is such contradictions that 
call into question the fragmentation within western psychology and western disciplines at 
large. Holdstock (2000) concludes that the real heart of the issue underlying the disunity and 
fragmentation in western psychology may come down to the irreconcilable separation 
between matter and spirit, estranging us from our bodies, our fellow human beings, science 
and the world we live in.  
Western psychology, as characterised by faulty universal claims, beliefs in objectivity, 
disunity and fragmentation, functions within a broader sociocultural context, which includes 
racism.   
 
WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY AND RACISM 
 
Racism has accompanied most of the history of western psychology and is still with us today, 
serving to alienate the discipline from its own subject matter (Howitt & Owusu Bempah, 
1994). Western psychology is of course a reflection of the society of which it is a part and the 
shifts we see in the presentation and form of racism in western psychology, resemble political 
and social shifts in local and global contexts. Phillips (2004) argues that western psychology 
is a microcosm of the larger world with its various conservative racist and progressive activist 
factions, which shift in relation to social changes. One of the most obvious of these is the 
shift from explicit to implicit racism. One might say that racism has gone underground, yet it 
continues to rear its ugly head from time to time. Baloyi (2008) for example points out that 
the composition of students and staff in clinical training programmes remains predominantly 
white, which given the ratio of white people to black in South Africa is nothing short of 
hypocrisy. 
My own experiences in academic contexts have also led me to question the morality of 
western psychology; by openly associating with “the enemy” I have been labelled a traitor 
and frequently been treated accordingly. While applying for a training programme at a well 
respected South African university I was disappointed to have one of the staff talk to me 
about the “incompetence” of black applicants for their programme, she had assumed, given 
my surname, that it would be safe to expose her racial bias with me.  
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Another good example is that in most psychology departments; of previously white 
universities, psychological supervision continues to take place along cultural (racial) lines. Is 
it only a coincidence that supervisors and students are perfectly paired according to culture 
(race)? 
Richards (2002) concludes that despite the removal of explicitly racist positions from western 
psychology, many of its assumptions are still based on racist Eurocentric discourses, meaning 
that the task of de-radicalizing is far from complete. Typical of this is the research by 
Winston (2004) who for example argues extensively against the injustices of racism in 
western psychology and that race is a construction, yet speaks of different races throughout 
the text. We prefer to speak of different cultures, and argue that there is only one race, the 
human race. If we continue along this trail of reasoning we also then realise that the use of 
the term racism may in itself be racist! As it assumes that “different races” are prejudiced 
towards each other, rather than different cultures, this perpetuates the belief that the human 
race can be sub-divided and allows room for judgment on the relative sophistication of each. 
Perhaps the real question then is what allows this situation to continue.        
Howitt and Owusu Bempah (1994) argue that the basic mechanism that allows western 
psychology to continue doing its racist work is one of scientific detachment, where the 
assumption that psychologists are mostly ethical and free of racist beliefs is falsely 
maintained. This detachment results in the true extent of the problem being downplayed and 
overlooked. Howitt and Owusu Bempah (1994) argue that western psychology does not view 
racism as a serious part of the modern experience; rather it is seen as a benign rare occurrence 
in society and something that does not exist in western psychology itself. Thus while 
psychologists may study racism, it is not seen as a feature of the discipline. It would seem 
that by turning a blind eye western psychology does not aim to serve humanity, but rather the 
vested interests of its members. The current situation, as outlined here, is where racism gets 
its true power, through its ability to promote inaction, thus protecting the status quo. 
In the course of formulating the ideas that I would eventually include in this study, I have 
repeatedly been told by colleagues that my efforts are redundant, that racism and inequalities 
between knowledge systems are gradually resolving themselves, and that no effort is 
required.  
Yet colonisation, racism and apartheid were not normal, natural occurrences and the struggle 
to overthrow these immoral systems of oppression was by no means natural, automatic, 
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unassisted and passive. In other words these injustices did not resolve themselves! 
Furthermore if we consider the vast and increasing number of calls by authors such as Balyoi 
(2008), Mkhize (2004), Holdstock (2000), Foster (2004) to name but a few, for western 
psychology to re-examine its assumptions and acknowledge its role in the injustices of the 
past and present, then surely the “automatic” restoration has failed to take effect. Our 
conclusion is that the arguments for leaving this “natural process” alone are simply a 
justification for maintaining western psychology’s dominant and imposed status, with little if 
any real regard for the welfare of the people who require “psychological” services in South 
Africa. 
Having considered western psychology in its current position and definition, in the context of 
racism, we reach a point where we can ask; how is western psychology relevant in an African 
context? 
 
RELEVANCE OF WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY IN AFRICA 
 
The question about the relevance of western knowledge; including psychological theories and 
frameworks, in African contexts has become salient in recent years, as indigenous people 
locally and globally, have started to argue for the right to define their knowledge in its own 
right and not in terms of existing western frameworks. This is a sentiment echoed by Wiredu 
(1992) who for example argues that african “philosophy” should reflect African lived 
experience, culture and epistemology. Western psychology is conceived within its own 
epistemology, and reflects the lived experiences of the west. Watkins and Shulman (2008) 
point out that it does not matter whether the focus of western psychology is individuals, 
families, society, or patterns of interaction, all of these western “mental” constructs are 
embedded within a particular epistemology. As we have already clarified in the preceding 
sections western psychology ignores this reality and continues to practice in universally 
applicable ways, due to its desperate aspirations to the status of being a “science”. If western 
psychology wants to be on a par with the western natural sciences, it must attempt to show its 
universal applicability; hence any notions of its relativity in the broader psychology 
landscape are dismissed. This has resulted in the reckless global expansion of western 
psychology, without adequate consideration of the potential for harm involved in doing so. 
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Therefore, one of the primary concerns we raise surrounding western psychology’s relevance 
in Africa, is that of potential harm for indigenous people. Watkins and Shulman (2008, p. 
275) argue that, “(We should) question the importation of dominant models of (western) 
psychology into oppressed communities, being mindful of the harm inflicted by both cultural 
invasion and concomitant neglect of knowledge from within indigenous and other 
marginalised communities”. The vast majority of “psychological” training in South Africa is 
still conducted using western theories and frameworks, which continues the process of 
imperialism through the colonising of “minds”. By forcing people to express themselves 
within the confines of a foreign “psychological” framework, indigenous people engage in 
what we refer to as personal imperialism. By this we mean that indigenous people are forced 
to internalise the dominant western perspective, resulting in them loosing touch with their 
own cultural heritage and frameworks. A good example of personal imperialism came to us 
in the form of opposition to the arguments defended in this study by indigenous African 
people themselves. Our experience and such responses suggest that they have been convinced 
and coerced into believing that western psychology is the only “psychology”. 
Personal imperialism thus creates the potential of westernised economic and personal 
expansion, while damaging the potential for authentic self expression. Hook (2004) points out 
that this process of adopting western psychology results in difficulties with identity for 
people in post colonial contexts. While indigenous people are no longer subject to legitimised 
colonisation, they are still subject to subtle colonisation, in the form of psychological, cultural 
and epistemological influence from the former oppressors. Fanon (cited in Hook, 2004) 
argues that this post colonial context allows people to be estranged from themselves, from the 
people around them and their world. South Africa is typical of such a post colonial context 
and any consideration of the relevance of western psychology must take cognisance of this 
fact.  
The question thus remains, what relevance does western psychology have in South Africa? 
As far as servicing the psychological needs of South Africans who function within a western 
epistemological framework, there is an obvious relevance to having psychology as practiced 
from the western perspective. Considering the unique South African context it is however 
unethical and insensitive to assume that western psychology can be directly imported and 
applied without first ensuring an appropriate fit. In the context of this study we envision the 
contribution of western psychology as an equal dialogical partner in the broader 
“psychology” landscape, instead of its current position of dominance and imposition. In an 
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equal dialogical relationship western psychology and African “psychology” would stand to 
gain and share a great deal of knowledge with each other. Finally, despite various 
misapplications, critical, liberation and community approaches have and continue to make 
valuable and arguably relevant contributions to the lives of all South Africans. These 
paradigms contribute to the articulation of critical concerns, facilitate the questioning of 
motivations and help foster engagement. It is of critical importance that the message of this 
study and related work is not misinterpreted as a call for the removal or replacement of 
western psychology, but is understood as a call for equality and mutual respect between 
epistemological frameworks. This will in our view create contexts of mutual respect and 
epistemological curiosity.      
So far in this chapter we have critically examined contextual aspects of western psychology, 
including racism and western psychology’s relevance in a South African context. We now 
introduce arguments in favour of a shifting our understanding of what “psychology” actually 
is. The first step requires us to differentiate between the western constructions of 
“psychology” and “psychological” thought itself. 
 
DIFFERENTIATING “PSYCHOLOGY” FROM “PSYCHOLOGICAL” THOUGHT 
 
The origin of “psychological” thought is a prehistoric mystery, which predates 3000 years of 
written history (O’ Boyle, 2006). Therefore “psychological” thought predates the emergence 
of the western term and discipline of “psychology”. The critical question then is what 
constitutes this human feature? The vast majority of literature on the history of western 
psychology indicates that “psychological” thought constitutes people’s efforts at different 
times and in various places to understand the causes of thoughts, feelings and behaviours. 
This explanation is however unsatisfactory, and is simply a reflection of a western 
understanding of “psychological” thought and knowledge, being perceived as universally 
applicable. Parrinder (2003) argues for example that African “psychological” thought has an 
emphasis on soul, relatedness and being. This is very different from western psychological 
thought with its explanatory stance and focus on the mind. 
O’ Boyle (2006) attempts to outline “universal” features of “psychological” thought such as 
common innate perceptual mechanisms, cognitive abilities such as abstract thinking and 
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emotions or feelings which accompany these purposeful abilities. The argument being, that 
all human beings have the basic mechanisms required for thinking, reasoning, feeling, 
describing and acting. These in turn are shaped in unique ways by language, epistemology, 
culture and socialising, to produce the various “psychologies”.  
Basic “psychological” abilities even predate modern humans, O’Boyle (2006, p. 3) notes that 
even “Neanderthals possessed the ability to produce music and…express the fears, longings, 
and joys in their lives”. Something poignant emerges from this quote, Neanderthals were by 
no means trying to understand the cause of their thoughts, feelings and behaviours, yet they 
displayed mechanisms recognisable as “psychological” thought. The emerging question then 
is how do we define “psychological” thought and knowledge?  Furthermore if the discipline 
of western psychology functions according to its understanding of what constitutes 
“psychological” thought or “psychology”, then what impact would redefinition of these 
constructs have? 
Disentangling “psychological” thought from psychology as conceived in the west is by no 
means easy as is evident in the following statement by Gentile and Miller, (2009, p. xi), “By 
psychological thought we mean the questions that people have asked and their attempts to 
answer those questions about the mind”. Accordingly “psychological” thought is equated to 
theorising about the “mind”, which is in line with a western understanding of psychology. If 
we now work according to this factually and conceptually flawed understanding of what 
“psychological” thought is, and try to find an equivalent amongst for example, the indigenous 
cultures in South Africa, we fail to find “psychological” thought and knowledge. We succeed 
then in reaching the reductio ad absurdum conclusion that there is no “psychology” in 
indigenous South African cultures. Gentile and miller (2009) go on to contradict themselves a 
few lines later stating that, “…psychological thought precedes psychology…” Yet their 
definition of this “psychological” thought is wholly based on a western understanding of 
psychology as delineated in chapter two. If we conclude that “psychological thought” is an 
intrinsically human feature, then we must surely be able to find “psychology”, in all cultures, 
including those indigenous to South Africa 
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AFRICAN PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Viljoen (2003, p. 529) asks the following question, “…Why did an indigenous African 
psychology not develop?” Viljoen argues that “mainstream” psychologists have to rely on 
information from the work of anthropologists, philosophers and theologians, who have 
studied the life, values, norms and cultures of Africans, in order to obtain knowledge about 
African psychological functioning. Viljoen’s argument is however problematic on a number 
of levels. For a start he assumes that it is the task of western “mainstream” psychology to 
study and describe the essence of the African psyche, rather than considering the possibility 
of African people theorising and articulating their own lived experiences. Viljoen assumes 
that a western approach is most appropriate and that his conception of psyche is universally 
applicable. By asking why an African psychology does not exist, he also implies that African 
people do not posses “psychological thought” as outlined in the preceding section. Surely if 
all human beings are capable of “psychological thought”, then African people must posses 
“psychology”. Baloyi (2008, p. 94) states that, “If there is African experience and thought, 
there can be no doubt that there is African “psychology’”. Clearly Viljoen is imposing his 
understanding of psychology, as being the study of the “mind”, formulated within a western 
epistemological framework, onto the African context. Nsamenang (1995) warns that African 
epistemological frameworks differ significantly from those generated in the west and that 
applying western categorisations and concepts to the African lived experience is not feasible. 
Therefore the question Viljoen should ask is why African lived experiences continue to be 
marginalised from mainstream “psychology”  
Balyoi (2008) argues that questioning the existence of an African “psychology”, is a 
reflection of the broader tendency of the west to doubt African people’s ability to 
conceptualise and theorise about their lived experiences. This would suggest that African 
people are incapable of authentically and “scientifically” describing their own experiences, 
unless they use existing western theories and frameworks.  
Nsamenang (1995) and Baloyi (2008), both argue that the best sustainable option is to 
develop an indigenous African “psychology” in its own right, which is not simply a 
duplication of western psychology, nor an attempt to adapt western approaches to the African 
context. In other words there is a growing imperative for the development of an African 
“psychology”, which is based on its own frameworks, theories and methodologies. If we 
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continue along this course of reasoning, then we must first confront an important stumbling 
block to the recognition of African “psychology” as a dialogical equal to western psychology; 
the question of what is “scientific”? 
 
SCIENCE, “PSYCHOLOGY” AND ACCESS TO REALITY 
 
To what degree and by which measure can we as human beings have access to an objective, 
true understanding of reality? Which methods and techniques are best suited to this process? 
For the majority of people who function within a western ontology and epistemology the 
answer is clear, the only objective way to interrogate reality is through rigorous “scientific” 
procedures that as a result of their systematic procedures produce reliable, valid, repeatable 
knowledge. 
The fundamental weakness in this approach is that it assumes that human beings can see 
reality as it actually is, and that scientific procedures increase the accuracy of our 
observations. We must however remember that science is a human invention or way of 
knowing, and that any observation, conducted by any means is still interpreted by human 
beings using their senses. This interpretation cannot be divorced from culture and 
epistemology. Thus when psychologists claim to have evidence for a phenomenon, it does 
not mean that this evidence is necessarily objective. Teo (2005) expands on these arguments 
by focusing on the process of knowledge production and refers to the “problem of 
knowledge”. Accordingly he argues that over time subjective meanings, which are derived 
from consensus, are transformed into objective facts, for example through “science”. This 
“knowledge” is in due course assumed to be a reflection of reality. Teo (2005) thus concludes 
that western psychological concepts do not correspond to real, objective entities, but are in 
fact related to historical processes and meanings developed in a particular context, such as 
language. Gergen (2009) concurs with Teo’s position and points to the construction of 
emotions by western psychologists as an example. How emotions are constructed and even 
the range of potential emotions that exist varies from one culture to the next, with very little 
consensus between them. Thus “psychological” constructions are embedded in history, 
culture and epistemology. Becvar and Becvar (2006) offer a similar point of view and argue 
that we cannot transcend ourselves to get a Gods eye view of reality, to know what is “really” 
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real. So while we do not deny the existence of a tangible reality or truth or even absolute 
knowledge, we argue that human beings by way of their limited sensory and perceptual 
capacities, cannot have an objective access to it. Western psychology as a human 
construction cannot necessarily bring us closer to truth; it may simply help meet our needs as 
we experience them. 
“The general quest for truth is to arrive at the bottom of things, but truth will always 
change. There cannot be certainty about truth when dealing with human beings due to 
their unpredictability. Different epistemologies and methodologies expose different 
truths in particular contexts.” 
                                                          (Extract from conversation with L.J Baloyi, 2011)  
 
PSYCHOLOGY AS A SCIENCE 
 
Baloyi (2008, p. 82) asks the following question, “By what conception of “science” is the 
psyche susceptible to “scientific” study?” This question has implications at various levels and 
calls into question the universal application of the empirical, western approach to psychology 
that developed from the mid 19th century onwards. Western “scientific” psychology is 
modelled on the same approach as adopted by the west, when investigating natural 
phenomena. The object of inquiry is broken down into smaller parts, with the hope that the 
underlying laws by which the phenomenon occurs will be identifiable. This method of 
inquiry is guided by principles such as rationality, logic and objectivity. Reductionistic 
approaches of this nature are generally seen as “good science” in western contexts, thus the 
operationalizing of the psyche into observable instances such as behaviour or patterns of 
interaction is seen as appropriate. Brennan, (1998) offers a similar argument and suggests that 
many westerners equate science and empiricism as being one thing, and therefore struggle to 
imagine that science could be anything else. This thinking is important to identify because it 
is a reflection the broader western cultural experience and epistemology. 
Brysbaert and Rastle (2009) argue that in order for western psychology to be recognised as a 
“science” like physics, it had to demonstrate its worthiness as a science, and the safest, most 
readily available way to achieve its desperate aspirations to the status of a natural “science” 
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was to adopt “the scientific method”. These authors go on to state that this is the reason why 
the founders of western psychology defined it as the study of the “mind”, by way of the 
“scientific method”. Of course the notion of “the scientific method” is in itself interesting as it 
precludes by definition, the existence of other truths or “scientific” approaches. In line with 
our argument for the recognition of indigenous “psychological methodology” we would 
argue for the use of a revised statement such as “the western scientific method”; a simple 
change, yet it serves to raise awareness of the existence of alternate interpretations of what 
can constitute “science”. 
If “psychological” thought is a reflection of the human capacity for describing, 
conceptualising and constructing experience within a particular cultural and epistemological 
context, then western psychology is surely one form of “scientific” thinking, or the approach 
developed for understanding experience in a particular culture. If we subscribe to this notion, 
then the process of describing, conceptualising and constructing of experience, in all cultures, 
using a variety of epistemological underpinnings are all equally “scientific”. It would then 
also be epistemologically and methodologically inappropriate to enforce the use of 
frameworks, theories and requirements for acceptability of knowledge generated in the west, 
when working in indigenous African contexts. All “psychologies” have their own unique 
frameworks, theories and methodologies. In addition to this they have the right to construct 
these epistemological components in their own unique ways, to describe them using their 
own vernacular and develop their own standards and methods for determining what 
constitutes valid, reliable, legitimate, “scientific” knowledge (Baloyi, 2008).  
One of the earliest critics of using “the scientific method” of the natural sciences in western 
psychology was Wilhelm Dilthey in the 1880s (cited in Brysbaert & Rastle, 2009). Dilthey 
argued that western psychology should be content based, with a focus on that which 
comprises the mind or peoples meaning structure. Accordingly, he argued that the subject 
matter of western psychology should be the human experience in its totality; he argued for 
the mind to be studied in its complete form and was opposed to the fragmenting of the human 
experience into smaller portions like emotions and cognition. Dilthey saw value in 
understanding the interplay of these functions as a coherent whole. He believed that people’s 
lives are embedded in their social, cultural, epistemological and historical contexts; hence it 
would not make sense to study people in isolation. Dilthey was convinced that the “scientific 
methods” of the natural sciences would not be able to capture the totality of the human 
experience, within its context. 
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Delthey’s critique resonates with the challenge indigenous knowledge systems face in South 
Africa and across the globe. If western psychology cannot fully represent the experiences of 
people who function within a western epistemology, and can only by way of “the scientific 
method” capture fragment’s of the total western experience, how can it possibly hope to 
authentically and adequately represent the lived experiences of indigenous people, who 
function within completely different epistemological frameworks? How could any western 
psychological approach, conceived within a fragmented conception of human beings, 
represent indigenous African experiences, where people are viewed as coherent wholes? The 
obvious conclusion in this regard is to allow indigenous African people to define for 
themselves, what constitutes “psychology”, using their own methodology, theories and 
frameworks (Baloyi, 2008). Furthermore it requires a revised understanding of that which we 
understand to be “scientific”.  
 
“SCIENTIFIC” AFRICAN “PSYCHOLOGY” 
 
We have argued in the preceding sections that all human beings, by way of living and 
experiencing, do in fact possess “psychological” thought and hence “psychology”. Our 
understanding is that western psychology, as the “scientific” study of the mind, only 
represents a single fragment of the total lived experience or “psychology”. 
Furthermore we have argued that western science and specifically psychology are western 
constructions. While these constructions may serve the perceived needs of westerners, they 
do not bring humanity any closer to an objective understanding of reality, nor do they provide 
any certainty in terms of the knowledge they generate. In other words western psychologists 
claim to be certain of their knowledge and make universal claims because they have used the 
systematic methods of “science”. But “science” itself is a human invention, thus one 
construction is used to prove the reality of another. Teo (2005) argues that because western 
science cannot legitimise its own activity in this way it relies on meta-narratives. Teo refers 
to two powerful meta-narratives, the first being the political narrative, which views scientific 
knowledge as freeing humanity from superstition and ignorance, so that we become agents of 
our own liberation. The second is the philosophical meta-narrative where progress in 
knowledge corresponds to advances in revealing truth. The rise of postmodernism has 
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reduced belief in meta-narratives, but there is still a tendency in the west to define “science” 
in terms of the myths of advancement and progress.  
By our understanding, all human knowledge as constructions of reality is equally valid, 
whether it is produced by intuition or rationality, by science or séance. We cannot transcend 
ourselves, to know what is really real (Becvar & Becvar, 2006). Thus the knowledge 
constructed in one culture can be no more or less valid than the knowledge generated in 
another culture. This also means that the lived experience or “psychology” in one culture is 
just as valid as that generated in another. 
If African lived experience is indeed “psychology” as we have argued here, then we must 
also argue that it is in fact “scientific” African “psychology”. African “psychology” is thus a 
perfectly legitimate contributor to the “psychology” landscape in its own right. African 
methodology, theories and frameworks, including equivalents to social constructionism, are 
thus scientific. African “science” then does not need to resemble western science to be 
recognised as such. We agree with Baloyi (2008) who calls for recognition of the scientific 
merit of indigenous “psychology” and argue that western psychology can expand its current 
range of inquiry to include methodologies from indigenous “psychologies”. Such expansion 
of western psychology may allow for a better representation of western lived experience in its 
totality.   
 
EXPANDING THE RANGE OF WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY: RECONNECTING 
WITH THE SOUL 
 
“The net consequence of (the western approach to psychology) is that psychological 
reality is reduced to that which can be codified, counted, and computed. In such a 
reduction, psychological reality is decontextualized, reified, and trivialised. The wish 
to attain scientific respectability forces a rigid adherence to count-measure rituals 
that compromise the salience of meaning and value in the human experience.” 
                                                                                                      (Bulhan, 1985, p. 68) 
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Given the arguments in favour of “psychology” being understood in context, and that 
“psychology” will take on very different forms or appearance, from one culture and 
epistemological framework to the next, it may be well justified to ask what these other 
“psychologies” could look like? And what this means for western psychology? At the start of 
this chapter we provided a brief critical description of western psychology in its current form, 
practice and definition. From this we could see that it is clearly rooted in a western scientific 
paradigm, including a variety of clinical, industrial, educational, and research applications. 
All of these falling within the consensual landscape of the “mind”, which as we have 
established is only a fragment of the human experience in its totality. This focus on mind in 
turn implies that the soul (or the totality of our experiences) does not require attention and 
can be divorced from our “mind” (De Chardin, 2003). The difference is that most, if not all 
other “psychologies” will have areas of inquiry and conceptions that extend far beyond the 
mind, human behaviour or systems thinking, which characterise western psychology (Naidu, 
2002). This further means that the separation between “psychology”, art, philosophy, 
theology and science as seen in the west, does not apply to other “psychologies”.  
Since its scientific inception in the mid 19th century, western psychology has gradually been 
moving away from being an art and form of philosophy to a focus on hard science (Varma, 
2002). While this focus on the “scientific” is useful, offering predictable knowledge, it is also 
reductionistic, which limits our creativity and frustrates our attempts to work with lived 
experience or the soul as a whole (Moon, 2004). The difficulty with such a focus is that the 
mind does not own the soul and the vast majority of western psychology aims to bring us 
closer to the mind. Accordingly it is only a multidimensional approach; of which western 
science is one part, which will bring us closer to understanding the western soul. 
Just as western science alone cannot explain the soul, it cannot explain art or why something 
has aesthetic value and beauty. The difference with art is that it does reflect soul, and may 
well be a direct expression of it. Thus we see the soul in creative, imaginative endeavours 
(Robinson, 2005). A further implication then is that art may also then serve a function in 
healing the soul, for example in rituals of inclusion amongst indigenous African people, 
where the reintegration of an alienated member of the community is done by way of 
ritualised (artistic) dancing. Moon (2004, p. vii) argues that, “the paintbrush, the guitar, the 
dancing body, the poets quill are tools of the soul and can therefore be tools of soul healing”. 
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RITUALS, ART AND WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Art rather than seeking to eliminate pain, discomfort and suffering, prompts people to explore 
their dark emotions, ideas and memories (Matravers, 2001). Exploring these aspects of the 
human experience allows them to be transformed into meaningful, life enriching parts of the 
self. Art gives expression to the lonely existential void of modern living, thus going beyond 
the restriction of impulses, erasing of symptoms, quantifying, analysing, pathologising and 
labelling (Moon, 2004).    
Clearly then one way to reintegrate the soul into western psychology is by including art in the 
form of music, poetry, sculpture, dance, ritual and other appropriate mediums (McNiff, 
2004). This will allow us to combine science as it is currently understood, with the science of 
the aesthetic, in order to more effectively and holistically express our humanity.   
So what does this mean for western psychology? We argue that this suggests the need to re-
examine the rationale by which we reduce the human experience to fragments, and broaden 
western psychology’s boundaries of inquiry to better reflect the lived experiences of the west. 
Consider for example how indigenous people are able to reflect their experiences or 
“psychology” in poetry, songs, rituals and dance. Why should the same not apply to 
westerners? Expanding the range of western psychology in such a way plays a facilitative 
role in repositioning western psychology as relative to other “psychologies”, by allowing it to 
have similar areas of inquiry and practice as part of its repertoire.  
While it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the specific contents of indigenous 
“psychologies”, it is well worth considering some of the broader areas of the human 
experience and representation, beyond “the mind”, which these may address. These include 
rituals, art in various forms, music, poetry, dance and oral traditions. In indigenous 
“psychologies” these are the “scientific” representations of the human experience. So if these 
experiences and practices are in fact “scientific”, then could a “research” outcome for 
example be a carving, or the performance of a ritual recorded on camera? Could we envision 
a library with master’s dissertations, side by side with “master’s sculptures” as equals? 
Recently I submitted a poem as a research product depicting the experiences of distance 
education students; my colleagues questioned my rationale for doing this, in place of 
submitting a journal article. My response was simple, how is a poem not psychology? And 
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more to the point how is it not scientific? Does it not authentically represent people’s 
experiences?   
Much like poetry, rituals are a misunderstood human phenomenon. Rituals are a normal part 
of every culture and serve a function in the community, yet rituals are not afforded any 
legitimacy in western psychology. This may be due to a fundamental misunderstanding about 
what a “ritual” actually is. The word ritual is equated to “primitive”, pre-scientific, magical 
thinking, yet every day people engage in ritualistic behaviour without realising it. Consider 
for example the ritual of drinking coffee, of knocking on a door before entering a room, or 
waiting to be told to take a seat. What about rituals in western psychology, the ritual of 
psychotherapy, for example. How is the throwing of bones by a traditional healer not a 
“diagnostic” tool or for that matter how is a DSM diagnosis is not a ritual? Both occur within 
a consensual domain, and a constructed reality.  
Music, pottery and carvings are further examples of aesthetic tools for “scientifically” 
representing lived experiences. When taken in context these are representations of 
“psychology” in physical aesthetic form. The textures, sounds, tastes and smells of our soul. 
The arguments in this chapter, suggest that it is conceivable to expand western psychology to 
include art, philosophy, theology, music and rituals. These are authentic expressions of self 
and lived experience in context, and as such have a “scientific” merit. Western psychology in 
its current definition is not open to aesthetic science or reflection on the soul. We see this as 
further affirmation of the need to redefine western psychology, to not only place it as relative 
to other “psychologies”, but also to demonstrate an openness to change and willingness to 
accommodate more of the western lived experience. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter we have critically argued for “psychology” to be understood in context. This 
requires a shift in how we view “science” and “psychology”, which are predominantly 
framed within a western epistemology and culture. Following from the position that 
knowledge is constructed within a particular, language, culture and epistemology, we argue 
that no form of knowing can objectively reflect reality. Western science and specifically 
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psychology are thus single interpretations of reality and are no more valid than any other 
cultures interpretation. It is in this context that we argue for the recognition of the “scientific” 
merit of all “psychologies” in the “psychology” landscape and acknowledgement of the fact 
that frameworks, standards, techniques, requirements, theories, and methodologies are unique 
to each “psychology”. 
Finally we have argued that if all “psychologies” are equally “scientific”, then there is no 
reason why they cannot learn and grow from each other as dialogical equals. Accordingly 
western psychology can adopt aspects from other “psychologies”, allowing for an extended 
range of inquiry and better representation of the total western lived experience or soul. 
Western psychology as currently defined is not yet ready to become a dialogical equal to 
other “psychologies”. We thus examine possibilities for coherent redefinition of western 
psychology in the chapter 4. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
INTRODUCTION: PART ONE 
 
Over the course of this year I have frequently been asked to present my research ideas at 
conferences and university functions. The opportunity to engage with people who have 
similar or at times very dissimilar points of view has served to inform my thinking and the 
direction of the current study. I have learned however that it is often the informal, unexpected 
moments, which present the greatest insights and have the most profound impact. One such 
experience seems relevant to this chapter; 
PP (psychology professor): Hi Justin, we have split the presentations into quantitative 
and qualitative groups, both venues are down the corridor on the left. 
Justin: I see, thank you, but I do not know which group to join? 
PP: Well your research must surely be one or the other? 
Justin: Are there only two types of study possible? 
PP: Generally your study will be one or the other. 
Justin: What about a conceptual (theoretical) Study? 
PP: Oh, yes! I forgot about that; well simply join the Qualitative group then. 
 
This encounter with the western psychology professor got me thinking, what if I had wanted 
to do a study within an african epistemological framework, using african theories and 
african methodology? After all there was not even provision made for a conceptual study, a 
well established form of western scientific inquiry. Would I still have been expected to 
present my study as quantitative or qualitative, positivistic or postmodern? Are these not 
categories of western psychology? Would my peers believe me, if I told them that african 
theory exists? At this point in our shared history is it really still necessary to ask whether an 
african “psychology” exists? It is such questions that bring us to the idea of redefining 
western psychology. 
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In this chapter we will focus on redefining western psychology in a South African context, on 
the basis of the arguments presented in the previous chapter and those presented in the 
following sections. We will however first need to address the challenges involved in the 
redefinition process.   
There are of course various challenges and obstacles to championing an equal dialogical 
relationship between western psychology and african “psychology” in a South African 
context. Through our discussion of these factors in this chapter it should become clear that 
the difficulties in doing so extend far beyond our local contexts and are often lodged in global 
ecologies and power relations. To re-envision “psychology” is also to re-envision politics, 
economics, religion and our very humanity. That which takes place in the “psychology” 
landscape is a microcosm of the global situation, with just as many complexities and 
sensitivities. 
 
CHALLENGES TO REDEFINING WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY IN A SOUTH 
AFRICAN CONTEXT  
 
POWER RELATIONS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 
 
Hardly a day goes by without some sort of power struggle playing itself out in the global 
arena; people from different countries, cultures, religions, societies and epistemological 
backgrounds, all vying to get the upper hand, or a larger slice of the global pie. The various 
role players find themselves defined according to hegemonic orders, which define their status 
and position in the global sphere of activities including power, status and privilege (Foster, 
2004). Each of these groups tends to want to forward their own agenda and usually has some 
sort of utopian image of the world where everyone is for example, a Christian or a Muslim. In 
addition to this, groups who have power and wealth such as the capitalist western nations find 
themselves having to fight to maintain their positions of power, while the poorer nations such 
as those in Africa or the East find themselves constantly fighting for equality and a fair share 
in the wealth. 
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The reasons for this situation are phenomenally complex and well beyond the scope of this 
study. There is however value in recognising the fact that even at a global level little 
consideration is given to the notion of an equal co-existence between different people, or 
dialogical engagement as equals (Kalouche, 2004). This is of critical importance when we 
start thinking about the “psychology” landscape and our call for an equal dialogical 
engagement between all the “psychologies” in it. There are at least two ways to look at this 
situation. The first may be to argue that if we cannot co-exist as equals in a global ecology, 
then it is unrealistic to think that we can have our “psychologies” co-exist. The second, and 
indeed the notion which we advocate, is to consider using the “psychology” landscape to 
model a different approach or way of being. A place where we can co-exist not despite our 
differences, but rather because we value them and realise the importance of co-evolving 
possibilities for the future. It is in this second scenario where we can work at changing the 
way we think, and after all it is the way we think that underlies how we interact, deal with 
problems and find meaningful ways to exist. 
The current dominance by western psychology of the “psychology” landscape is thus a 
reflection of the current dominance by the west in general (Huygens, 2009). This seems to be 
a strange situation, given the shift in the latter part of the 20th century to more “democratic” 
ways of living across most of the globe. Perhaps democracy then is simply a way of 
maintaining broader global systems of power and its failure to bring about true equality is a 
reflection of this.      
 
THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY AS REFLECTED BY THE “PSYCHOLOGY” 
LANDSCAPE 
 
After sixteen peaceful years, South Africa could be considered one of the most successful 
democracies in post colonial Africa. Democracy is widely understood to be a moral 
imperative for Africa’s future and promises prosperity for those who adopt it (Ntalaja, 1997). 
But how egalitarian is our society?  
One of the greatest barriers to equality generally and specifically amongst the “psychologies” 
is money. Western psychology has become, amongst other things, a money making 
enterprise.  Anything that legally makes money in a capitalist dominated society is given 
 61 
 
priority, is seen as being of great value and is maintained accordingly (Muir, 1973). To ask 
western psychology to be more humble, while genuinely putting healing and people’s welfare 
first, is to threaten its lucrative positioning and control. Western psychologists may fear 
competition from indigenous “psychologies” and the implications of their independent co-
existence. For example, psychometric testing of non-western populations such as mine 
workers or heavy machine operators may become a contestable issue, when these people are 
no longer forced to be “mentally fit” by western norms, measures and standards. We can 
further this argument by pointing out the use of the 16 personality factor test, which is so 
frequently used for the aforementioned purpose. This test reflects western culture and 
epistemology, yet is used to make assessments about non-western people’s personality 
features. In such an instance western psychologists would lose business to people who 
develop relevant African tests, from within an african “psychology”.  
The role of money cannot be underestimated as a maintaining factor, when examining what it 
is that keeps western psychology in its elitist position (Onyegbula, 2004). Western 
psychology serves the needs of middle to upper class people, corporate business and industry, 
who all can pay handsomely for such “services”. The idea of working with poorer 
communities challenges western psychologists to step out of their cushy practices and 
corporate jobs, to engage with people who are in desperate need of appropriate, relevant 
“psychological” services. 
The prioritization of people according to money and the maintenance of western 
psychology’s dominant position in the “psychology” landscape through economic power are 
by no means democratic. If anything this is a reflection of what Ramose (2010) refers to as 
timocracy or rule by money. Western psychology rules the “psychology” landscape by its 
access to money, which in a capitalist system gives it power. Ramose (2010) further argues 
that the ownership of wealth, or as is the case of western psychology the ability to generate 
wealth, becomes the defining characteristic for determining who has access to justice and 
power. This situation is perfectly reflected by the current “psychology” landscape. The result 
of which is the subordinating of human dignity and rights to what Ramose (2010) calls the 
sovereignty of money and the loss of democracy. 
While colonisation and de-colonisation have been linked to the spread of democracy, 
timocracy has meant that even though people have been granted freedom in political 
domains, the colonisers have maintained control over indigenous people’s economy, 
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knowledge systems and equally critically their “psychology”. We thus resonate strongly in 
this study with Ramose’s notion of the death of democracy, and argue here that the dominant 
position of western psychology is yet a further illustration of this process.  
 
WESTERNISATION, MODERNITY AND THE WORSHIP OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
The implicit or at times blatantly explicit assumption in developing countries is that rapid 
technological advancement or “westernisation” is required to resolve the socio-political and 
economic strife hampering their development. This despite the fact that the wealth and 
prosperity of developed nations; who are perceived to be role models, has by and large been 
produced at the expense of the very same developing nations (Lewis, 2008). The use of the 
term “developing” countries is in itself a problem. Consider for example how the various 
African nations were perfectly capable of living in self sustaining ways prior to western 
colonisation, imperialism and slavery. How can people who were capable of living in 
sustainable ways be seen as “underdeveloped”? Is the consumer mentality of the west a sign 
of further or higher development? The holy grail of our modern world has become 
sustainable living, yet we forget that indigenous people have lived in harmony with their 
environments for thousands of years. Gergen (2009) supports this argument, noting that the 
human population continues to expand, with an ever increasing appetite for industrial 
production and ever more effective technologies of control. This mind-set has alienated many 
from the myths of progress, profit and expansion, resulting in the realisation that sustainable 
living is the only viable and necessary alternative. Yet despite this, the indigenous ways of 
sustainable living are somehow ignored in favour of the mythology of adopting a “more 
advanced” western lifestyle in Africa. This phenomenon reflects a belief that the inevitable 
evolutionary path of all cultures and societies is a gradual progression towards the ways of 
living found in the west. Richards (2002) argues that evolution in the west is seen as 
inevitably progressive, reflecting a shift from organic evolution to social evolution, where 
savagery and barbarianism are replaced by modernism. This mythology rests on the discourse 
that westerners are further in their development and their “superior” knowledge and 
technology are reflections of this. 
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It is all too easy to imagine how people living in impoverished circumstances would crave the 
perceived comfort and convenience of the west, and why they may be tempted to adopt a 
western lifestyle and values. Imagine also the desire for approval and inclusion by people 
who have had to fight so hard for equal rights and access. In racist, oppressive systems, it can 
be very tempting to see western hegemonies as superior or better, especially when dominant 
discourses suggest that this is the case (Huysseune, 2006). It must also then be easy to 
become blind to the flaws of these grandiose western ways of being. 
The rapid implementation of western lifestyles, medicine, technology and knowledge has 
primarily served to further divide the gap between the rich and the poor in Africa. Instead of 
offering a viable solution it has become an area of material separation and a moral 
imperative. The problem is that modernity or modernisation has two faces. Foster (2004) 
notes that the first is that of emancipation, progress and hope, while the second is that of 
racism, colonialism, large scale wars, genocide, imperialism and the economic exploitation so 
often linked to capitalism. McGuigan (2006) concurs with this argument and adds that the 
worst effects of modernity only become visible after some time. Foster (2004, p. 15) argues 
that, “While modernity may have spawned all sorts of discoveries and achievements, these 
very developments, for instance of science and technology, have also produced potential 
threats, environmental degradation, possibilities for mass human destruction, and risks of all 
sorts, leading some to argue that our contemporary social formation is a ‘risky society’”.  
The preference for everything western extends into the “psychology” landscape as well, 
bringing with it problems such as alienation, insecurity, dehumanisation, internalised 
oppression (personal imperialism), anxieties, narcissism, addictions, dual consciousness, fear 
and depression (Foster, 2004). However these costs tend to be perceived as a “small” price to 
pay, for the “benefits” of using a predictable, “scientific”, western psychology. We have for 
example noted that very often resistance to the ideas defended in this study comes from non-
western people, the same people whose knowledge we wish to see liberated from the 
constraints of imposed western knowledge systems. Why do these people defend the use of 
an alien, imposed “psychology”? 
Western “scientific” psychology is a product of modernism, which has and continues to be 
complicit in its support of issues such as imperialism and racism (Foster, 2004). Despite this, 
the modernistic discourse offers a strong draw, as part of a world where people want the 
latest cars, cell phones and most “up to date” knowledge. Keeping up with the Joneses and 
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not appearing to be out of date and “backwards” seems to be more important than critically 
reflecting on whether these “advancements” are truly beneficial to human kind, the way to 
“keep up” appears to be through the adoption of western thinking, lifestyles, religion and 
thinking. Foster, (2004, p. 17) argues that, “(western) psychology almost by definition 
undermines critical social thinking, through its idea of the individual who is made the focus 
and source of all problems, allowing the social world itself to fade into the background”. Teo 
(2005) agrees with Foster arguing that modernity and modern western societies are dependant 
on the notion of the individual and thus view the concepts of group, community and society 
as being of lessor importance. In these individualistic contexts it is seldom beneficial to speak 
out against the hegemony of western practices, driving people to be silent, so as to simply 
survive, be promoted and so forth. This internalising and self imposed imperialism is what we 
have referred to as personal imperialism, which as part of western modernity offers a 
substantial obstacle to redefining and repositioning of western psychology. 
 
INTERNALISING DOMINANT WESTERN DISCOURSES: CULTURE AND 
ACCULTURATION AS A FORM OF PERSONAL IMPERIALISM 
 
“The most potent thing in the hands of the aggressor, is the mind of the oppressed” 
                                                                                                                                 (Biko, 1971) 
 
One of the legacies of colonialism and apartheid is a tendency to view western culture and 
knowledge as somehow better than those of indigenous people, by both the former oppressors 
and the oppressed (Konrad, 2006). We use the term “former oppressors” loosely here, 
because as (Huysseune, 2006) argues, western culture is still oppressive and simply takes on 
modern forms such as globalisation, economic domination and subtle racism. It is also 
important when discussing culture and acculturation to mention both sides of the “coin” as it 
were, because both the beliefs of westerners and indigenous peoples serve to maintain the 
current dominance of western culture and specifically in this study western psychology.  
Westerners, or at least people who identify themselves as western, are well represented in the 
“psychology” landscape. This is understandable given that western psychology functions 
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inappropriately as “the psychology landscape” itself. For most westerners there is little 
perceived need to challenge their psychology’s dominance or “rock the boat”, because their 
psychological needs are being met. Hollway (cited in Foster, 2004) argues that this tendency 
by westerners to not question their own psychology is as a result of psychological investment. 
In other words westerners are heavily invested their own subjectivities, and accordingly are 
resistant to questioning their thinking or considering change. Westerners are thus oppressed 
by their own knowledge system. The irony being that this is a representation of the dialogical 
nature of imperialism where both oppressor and oppressed are ultimately victims.  
Indigenous experiences are by contrast poorly represented in the western dominated 
“psychology” landscape. While many do argue against this, there are those who simply 
accept that western knowledge is better and more “civilised” than their own. Perhaps this 
links to years of being forced to psychologically invest in alien languages, knowledge and 
ways of being, combined with a desperate desire for inclusion and acknowledgement. It may 
be hard for indigenous people to question internalised western understandings, especially 
given their dominance and “scientific” superiority. So, much like the former oppressors, the 
oppressed do not always effectively question the western status quo, which has been so 
heavily entrenched in our society. This may partially explain why oppressed people can 
become equally resistant to change.  
The process of personalising oppression thus represents the ultimate form of imperialism, 
namely one which is self imposed, where the oppressed defend their own oppression (Fanon, 
1986). We have mentioned before the resistance offered in response to some of the ideas put 
forward in this study by indigenous people, yet we argue here for recognition of their 
“psychology” and knowledge in its own right. This is very reminiscent of the stage theory 
proposed by Bulhan (cited in Hook, 2004), for identity development in oppressive contexts. 
Stage one: involves capitulation, where the oppressed identify with their aggressors as a form 
of defence, similar to Stockholm syndrome. People become alienated from their root cultures 
and take on the standards, values, and ways of knowing of the dominant culture. Stage two: 
involves revitalisation, which is an absolute rejection of the oppressive culture, in much the 
same way as their own cultures were rejected. At this point people celebrate their own 
culture, but their identity is still formed in terms of being at odds with the dominant culture. 
So while this is useful for reconnecting with one’s roots it is still defensive and does not bring 
about ways in which numerous cultures can co-exist. Stage three: which we attempt to 
represent in this study is radicalisation, where people are committed to social change in order 
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to bring about equality, fairness and justice. Here the former oppressors and oppressed find 
healthy ways to co-exist, to work together and start to truly heal the wounds of the past 
(Riikonen, 1999). It is here where we can envision new social realities. 
The process of identity formation in oppressive contexts, and those which remain oppressive 
despite political emancipation, is critical to consider when arguing for redefinition and 
repositioning of western psychology. Westerners need to realise and acknowledge the 
limitations of their own psychology and develop an understanding of why we need many 
“psychologies” to represent different lived experiences. The challenge for non-western 
cultures is equally significant in that they not only need to let go of the notions of western 
superiority, but also need to reconnect with their cultural heritage, moving beyond 
capitulation and revitalisation to a point of radicalisation. If western psychology fails to shift 
its understandings for the sake of comfort, for fear of change or due to internalised forms of 
oppression, then it will be a complicit contributor to the unilateral globalisation of western 
knowledge, technology and psychology.  
  
CURRENT TRENDS TOWARDS INTERNATIONALISING OR GLOBALISING OF 
WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Globalisation essentially represents a modern form of imperialism, perpetuating the economic 
and intellectual dominance of the world by western nations (Callinicos, 2007). Staeuble 
(2006, p. 184) argues that the, “European civilisation has established a superior position and 
remained the centre from which some of its achievements have spread to the ‘intellectual 
void’ in other parts of the world”. Accordingly the discipline of western psychology, as part 
of the broader western scientific discourse, that views “western knowledge” as superior to 
that of ingenious cultures, offers globalisation of western psychology as a solution, given the 
“lack” of indigenous “psychologies”.   
Staeuble (2006) argues that western psychology’s global expansion has been particularly 
problematic, given its “hidden” western worldview. Consider for example, notions like 
individualism, which do not fit with indigenous conceptions of the person and world. 
Western constructs are perceived as components of a foreign epistemology that do not 
resonate with local experiences. Trask (2009) puts forward a similar argument and points out 
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that globalisation includes more than mere modernisation. Globalisation includes 
fundamental changes in the way people live and their ideologies. Globalisation usually links 
to a spreading of western concepts like individualism, rationalism and democracy around the 
world. This tends to be followed by a corresponding suppression of traditional values and 
indigenous “psychology” (Trask 2009). 
Staeuble (2006) argues that the current trend in western academia of “internationalization” or 
“globalisation” of western psychology needs to be scrutinised, in terms of its concealment of 
the imbalance of international knowledge production, by western vs. non-western people. As 
Foster (2004) argues, globalisation is an uneven process which despite offering potential 
advantages, continues to supress local customs and knowledge. Globalisation of western 
psychology is thus a part of the larger global expansion and domination by western culture, 
which has essentially become a modern form of imperialism (Huysseune, 2006). This 
situation is not however a deterministic double bind as Foster suggests, and depends on the 
form which globalisation takes. 
Globalisation tends to take one of two forms. The first is unilateral, where globalization is 
based on the belief that one culture’s values and ideals are better than those of another, 
resulting in the imposing of a single, very often western norm, as the global standard (Kim & 
Park, 2007). The second according to Kim and Park (2007, p. 147) is, “Enlightened 
globalisation…based on understanding, dialogue, respect and integrating knowledge to foster 
cultural development.” This form recognises that each culture has its own values, beliefs, 
skills and resources that can be shared. Western psychology as it is currently defined tends 
towards unilateral globalisation, under the guise of superiority of western knowledge. From 
this position it is not possible to grow and develop through equal dialogical engagement with 
indigenous “psychologies”. The result is that western psychology has become stagnant, and 
devoid of fresh perspectives. All cultures, people and epistemological frameworks, can share 
and learn from each other, but only if they can engage as dialogical equals. If western 
psychology defines itself into isolation, through being the science of the “mind”, then how 
will it grow and develop in such an existential void? Globalisation, geared to the application 
of western psychology as the norm, adapted for local use and selectively adopting indigenous 
knowledge to do so, is not sustainable. 
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WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SELECTIVE INCLUSION OF INDIGENOUS 
KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICES 
 
“The discourse of power in (academia) has shifted in the past decade from 
exclusionary practice to one of selective inclusion”  
                                                                                                       (Behdad, 1993, p. 46)  
 
Western psychology has come to dominate the “psychology” landscape as the absolute 
universal norm of human lived experience. Western psychologists justify this imbalance by 
claiming “scientific” superiority and authority, as discussed in chapter 3. It is from this 
dominant position that western psychology controls that which is included from other 
“psychologies” into its body of “scientific” knowledge. Thus western psychology is not 
considered to be a contributor to the “psychology” landscape, but rather is imposed as the 
landscape or framework, that can accommodate all other “psychologies”. Indigenous 
“psychologies” are thus denied an existence in their own right, and instead are relegated to 
the position of folk psychology or oral tradition, which can supposedly be understood from a 
western perspective (Holdstock, 2000). The question we pose in this regard is, should 
inclusion of indigenous “psychology”, into the supposed “mainstream”, as dominated by the 
west, be the goal in the first place? 
The general consensus amongst western psychologists is that indigenous people need to be 
studied “scientifically” in order to generate an indigenous “psychology’ which can then be 
included into the “mainstream”. The first problem here, as noted in chapter 3 is that 
mainstream and western psychology are equated, accordingly western psychology is seen as 
the landscape, rather than a contributor to the landscape. The second problem that then 
emerges from this situation is the attempt to use western theories, frameworks and 
methodologies, to describe the lived experiences of indigenous people, which due to their 
origin in a foreign epistemology, do not fit, nor resonate with local experiences (Baloyi, 
2008). Indigenous people therefore have to adapt their experiences to fit with the pre-existing 
norms of western psychology, which makes authentic self and cultural expression impossible. 
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The third problem, related to the first two is that of selective inclusion (Behdad, 1993). As a 
result of the misfit of western frameworks, not all indigenous experiences can be adapted or 
manipulated to fit western theories, thus only certain elements of indigenous “psychologies” 
are included. For example ubuntu, which can manipulated to superficially fit with humanistic 
western psychology and is thus included under the category of african “psychology”.  
Furthermore there is the inseparable link between epistemology, culture and values. By 
attempting to include indigenous “psychologies” into western psychology, a conflict of value 
systems is established. In other words western psychology reflects the social norms of the 
west, and works within these to determine what is acceptable for inclusion or not. Thus only 
those components of indigenous “psychologies” that reflect or do not contradict western 
values can be included in the “mainstream”, further driving the process of selective inclusion. 
Finally, because western psychology provides “the” framework, for example social 
constructionism as a postmodern approach, the emphasis of inclusive practices becomes 
content. By including indigenous content, without an appropriate context or a larger 
framework to coherently organize the complexity of this knowledge, western psychology 
succeeds in omitting the most important aspects (Kim, Yang & Hwang, 2006). The very 
value of indigenous knowledge is its difference, but only if understood in its totality. 
Inclusive thinking in this regard, be it complete or selective, is thus epistemologically 
problematic. While inclusive practices may appear to have an emancipatory function, they in 
fact continue to subjugate indigenous knowledge and practices. Inclusive thinking is thus 
about appearance, seeming to want input from new sources, but in actual fact merely 
tolerating it. 
 
TOLERANCE VERSUS APPRECIATION OF DIVERSITY 
 
It is all too common to hear calls by the western scientific community for tolerance of 
difference, when dealing with people who differ from themselves or when they attempt to 
understand epistemological viewpoints that seem irreconcilable with their own. Tolerance 
does however have some negative attributes. The primary flaw in tolerance revolves around 
power afforded to the tolerater versus the toleree. In other words someone or something; in 
this case a culture or epistemological framework, is subservient to something else, and is 
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accordingly allowed to make a carefully regulated contribution. Western psychology as the 
dominant “psychology” in the “psychology” landscape has through its illegitimate 
positioning, been allowed to tolerate selective input from indigenous “psychologies”. This is 
highly reminiscent of tokenism, where previously disadvantaged people receive political 
dispensation, and are thus integrated into the mainstream of society. Unfortunately, the 
underlying view is that these people are afforded access to western psychology, due to legal 
and political requirements. As a result there is no genuine interest in what they have to offer. 
Apart from the fact that tolerance serves to perpetuate a power imbalance between 
“psychologies” and the on-going subjugation of indigenous people, it also provides an avenue 
for the continuation of racism in western psychology. If anything tolerance and racism seem 
to be inseparable. 
Howitt and Owusu-Bempah (1994) argue that changing western psychology, and finding a 
way to meet the needs of everyone rather than a privileged few requires more than simple 
tolerance. For them tolerance is an attitude that indicates a reluctance to change and the 
enduring of something unpleasant, forced and unwanted. In other words it is the putting up 
with something because you have too, and not because you actually want it around. Tolerance 
is inherently linked to the belief in ones superiority and the weakness or inferiority of anyone 
who is different from you. There cannot be any genuine understanding, or acceptance under 
such conditions. Owusu-Bempah (1994, p. 17) concludes that, “(western) psychology cannot 
afford mere…tolerance, that is the best that bigots can achieve”. 
Appreciation departs significantly from tolerance as a mind-set and by contrast has the 
underlying notion of embracing difference. Strous (2003, p. 57) argues that, “Because human 
and cultural diversity are at the very core of psychology, a multicultural perspective might 
celebrate, rather than be threatened by cultural diversity”. Appreciation stems from a deep 
desire to learn from that which is new, different, unfamiliar and at times confusing. Many 
western scientists similarly argue that the best possible outcome of research is something 
verifiably inexplicable, because it is through our attempts to understand the phenomena that 
we learn more about ourselves. The knowledge generated by inquiry is thus a projection of 
the observer’s features and “psychology”. By contrasting and sharing information between 
“psychologies”, “psychologists” both challenge and inform their own thinking. 
Appreciation invokes difference as a resource for understanding and enriching our lived 
experiences. Hence we feel that difference is not something that needs to be managed or dealt 
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with, but rather embraced. People in multicultural contexts, such as South Africa, are very 
often under the impression that difference is a handicap, which inevitably drives disunity and 
cannot result in a harmonious co-existence of cultures and epistemologies. In truth this may 
be quite the opposite as Snyders (2000, p. 205) argues, “Far from being frightening and 
inhibiting, difference should be celebrated in a multicultural context, since difference and 
news of difference is the very stuff which fuels novelty, creativity and change”. 
 
REDEFINING WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY IN A SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT  
 
INTRODUCTION: PART TWO 
 
Having considered some of the challenges in bringing about equality in the “psychology” 
landscape, we can now turn our attention to redefinition and the corresponding repositioning 
of western psychology in a South African context. 
In the preceding chapters and sections we focused on the emergence of western psychology, 
and how it has come to dominate what we have referred to as the “psychology” landscape. 
This has been to the detriment of the other “psychologies” in the landscape. We have also 
considered the meaning of “psychology” in context and have shown that, that which is 
“scientific” varies from one context, culture and epistemology to the next. “Psychology” is 
accordingly that which meets people’s experiential needs and is consensually agreed upon. 
This laid the required groundwork for our current call for an equal dialogical engagement 
between all the “psychologies” in the “psychology” landscape. This should be based on the 
principles of co-existence and mutual appreciation of epistemologies, as opposed to inclusion 
and tolerance by one dominant perspective.  
In addition to the above, it has also become clear that western psychology in its current form 
and definition is not ready to become an equal dialogical partner in the “psychology” 
landscape. It should first be redefined in such a way that it plays a co-facilitative role in 
shifting itself from being “the landscape” to being a participant in it. The onus for redefinition 
falls on western psychology, because it has defined itself into isolation and accordingly a 
position of dominance in the “psychology” landscape. As other “psychologies” find their 
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voice and definition it would be short sighted for western psychology not to respond and 
adapt itself, lest it be left behind or rendered irrelevant in an African context. With this in 
mind we argue, first, for redefinition of western psychology, in terms of the soul or lived 
experience in its totality. Second we argue for a repositioning of western psychology in the 
lived experience landscape as an equal contributor and finally we consider the potential value 
of taking these steps. 
 
WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY AS A REPRESENTATION OF LIVED EXPERIENCE IN 
CONTEXT 
 
“The twentieth century legacy of (the) science of the mind is a discipline deeply 
divided against itself, split into a myriad of sub-disciplines. Some…focus on aspects 
of the mind, such as cognition or emotion; others on aspects of the body, such as 
neurotransmitters or reflexes; still others… focus on the unconscious…All of these 
are equally abstractions, drawing us away from living, breathing, acting and 
experiencing.”                                                                                   
                                                                                                         (Reed, 1997, p. 220) 
 
Lived experience is the totality of our experiential realities, also known by the term human 
soul. Bunyan (2008) thus argues that the soul is the whole of the human being. Bunyan 
further argues that one part of the soul is memory, which functions as the souls register. In 
other words past and present lived experiences are stored in memory and thus become part of 
the soul. Van Manen (1990) confirms this, arguing that lived experience breathes meaning 
into the soul. This links to early definitions of the soul or spirit that literally mean “to 
breathe” (Baloyi, 2008). Van Manen (1990) further maintains that lived experience is the 
totality of human life; it is what it is to be human as a whole. On the basis of similar 
arguments Holveck (2002) concludes that, the soul is embodied in lived experience, which 
simultaneously is expressed in each unique language, culture and epistemology. 
In chapter 3 we argued that all living breathing human beings have lived experience or soul 
and by implication “psychology”. The significance of this argument being that we view the 
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totality of lived experiences, including the mind as being “psychology”. This means that there 
is “psychology” within every culture and epistemological framework, as each has lived 
experience or soul. The difficulty with advocating our viewpoint is that contemporary 
western psychology has lost touch with its past (chapter 2).   
After the end of the classical era, western psychology began to gradually shift its focus from 
the soul or lived experience in its totality, to an emphasis on the mind (Reed, 1997). In the 
late 19th century a more rapid change occurred, when western psychology became a “science” 
and completely disconnected itself from the soul. Teichman (1974) argues that western 
psychology attempted to separate mind and soul, in order to deny the souls existence, while 
maintaining the “reality” of the mind. This meant that in the future western psychology 
would be limited to a fragment of the western lived experience, namely mind (Bunyan, 
2008). The discipline did however keep its original namesake “psyche”, which even today 
causes confusion, given that its meaning is soul, not mind. The net result of these shifts is that 
contemporary western psychology neglects a large part of the western lived experience, 
making it impossible to understand westerners as coherent wholes. 
A further implication as discussed previously is the isolation of western psychology, relative 
the other “psychologies”. Western psychology as the science of the mind is incomplete; it is 
missing the remaining components of lived experience, such as spiritual, metaphysical and 
aesthetic experiences. As Teichman (1974) argues, soul is much more than mind, mind is 
simply the soul’s intellectual component. It is therefore not possible to authentically and 
adequately represent western lived experience by focusing on a single, largely intellectual 
fragment of the soul. 
For western psychology to be effectively positioned as relative to other “psychologies” in the 
“psychology” landscape it needs to define itself out of isolation. This requires a shift in focus 
from the single fragment of lived experience namely mind, to lived experience in its totality 
i.e.: soul or psyche, of which mind is a part. This is thus an argument for coherently reuniting 
western psychology with the rest of the soul or psyche. Reed (1997) advances a similar 
argument and calls for a western psychology to become a science of the soul that represents 
lived experience in its totality. Reed justifies his call by arguing that western psychology has 
systematically substituted lived experience with phenomena such as stimuli, behaviour, 
patterns and responses. Consequently western psychology struggles to represent the everyday 
lived experiences of ordinary people. This also means that western psychology places severe 
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limits on itself as it is currently defined, by being at best a partial representation of the 
western soul or psyche. This again is the very same reason for western psychology’s isolation 
and dismissive attitude towards other “psychologies”. 
Holdstock (2000) also emphasises that the human being needs to be considered in his or her 
totality, with due attention to how the parts make up the whole. This means we must move 
beyond our fragmented ways of thinking and acknowledge the extent of our connections and 
relatedness. Western psychology in its current definition reflects the failure of one 
epistemology and culture to adequately account for and represent the complexity of human 
existence and experience. By limiting its focus to the mind western psychology fails to 
authentically represent the experiences of the west and through its dominance of the 
“psychology” landscape denies other “psychologies” the opportunity to authentically 
represent themselves.      
By allowing western psychology to be defined as “a” science of the soul or lived experience, 
we create the possibility of better representation of western people’s experiences in their 
contexts and the meaning attached to these. We also then facilitate the understanding that if 
“psychology” is defined as lived experience, we will find “psychology” wherever we have a 
living, breathing, experiencing human beings. Therefore all people, in all cultures posses 
“psychology”. To deny the existence of their “psychology” is to deny their existence at all 
(Baloyi, 2008). 
 
“PSYCHOLOGIES” AS DIALOGICAL EQUALS: ADVOCATING CO-EXISTENCE  
 
In chapter two we showed that western psychology is a construction of one particular culture 
and epistemology. In other words western psychology is uniquely western and is informed by 
the history and lived experiences of westerners. In chapter three we argued that that all 
constructions of experience, in all cultures are equally valid and “scientific”. The implication 
being that knowledge generated in the west, despite being called “scientific”, is no more 
accurate than that of knowledge generated elsewhere. We also introduced arguments for the 
recognition of indigenous “psychology” as scientific in chapter three, laying the groundwork 
for redefinition of western psychology, as argued for in the preceding section. It is on the 
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basis of these understandings that we argue for the co-existence of all the “psychologies”, in 
the lived experience landscape.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Psychology as it is currently defined, with western psychology acting as the 
“psychology” landscape, the centre from which all other “psychologies” emerge. 
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Figure 2: Western psychology as a participant in the lived experience landscape, with all 
“psychologies” functioning as dialogical equals. 
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The co-existence of “psychologies” opens up interesting, and perhaps challenging 
possibilities for the future of “psychology” as a discipline in South Africa. Psychology 
departments for example may need to allocate equal time and effort to both western and 
african “psychology”. The departments may also wish to rename themselves in a way that 
reflects the various “psychologies” of which they are comprised. They could for example be 
called departments of lived experience.  
“Psychological” societies such as PsySSa would certainly be challenged to rethink their 
current western psychology basis and focus. Perhaps we could envision a “lived experience 
society of South Africa” in the future. 
“Psychological” training programmes across the country would need to restructure there 
curriculum to have equal input from indigenous african and western “psychology”. This in 
itself would be complex, consider for example the possibilities of conducting research from 
two different epistemologies, using unique theories, frameworks and methodologies.  
Clearly then the call for co-existence of “psychologies” is one that will be met with a number 
of challenges, which may seem insurmountable. One way to overcome these concerns may be 
to focus on the potential value of co-existence, as opposed to the current domination by one 
“psychology”.          
 
THE VALUE OF EQUAL DIALOGICAL ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL FRAMEWORKS 
 
“Is there anything new in psychology?” This is the Question posed by (Hergenhahn, 2005, p. 
603). By psychology Hergenhahn is of course referring to western psychology, and comes to 
the conclusion that when it comes to conceptual knowledge, rather than technological 
advances, western psychology is still asking the same questions as those posed by its various 
founders, for example, what is Human nature? Or how are mind and body related? So despite 
the changing emphasis over the decades, and availability of research tools, western 
psychology is still perplexed by certain questions. We would argue that part of the problem 
lies in being both enabled yet trapped by one’s epistemology (Becvar & Becvar, 2006). It is 
only through exposure to difference, that we can achieve a critical distance from our own 
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thinking or ask fresh questions. In other words questions asked in one “psychology” may be 
unique, due to the influence of culture and epistemology, these may in turn trigger new 
directions of inquiry in another “psychology”. For example a “psychologist” working within 
an african “psychology” framework may ask about the relationship between people and their 
ancestors in daily living. This could stimulate fresh research by a western psychologist on 
trans-generational or family scripts, where the possibility of family heritage on daily living 
could be investigated. The point here is that through interacting with each other, the various 
“psychologies” open up fresh areas of inquiry and curiosity. As far as the opening question 
above, there could then truly be new areas to investigate in western psychology. These new 
questions and areas of inquiry may also require openness to asking theological, philosophical 
and moral questions in western psychology, as noted previously. 
Medawar (cited in Hergenhahn, 2005) argues that there are certain crucial questions that 
western science cannot answer, and these are more appropriately addressed to philosophy and 
theology. As is clear from the preceding chapter this may not apply to African indigenous 
“psychology”, where the focus may well be on questions of a philosophical and metaphysical 
importance. This is much like early philosophical western psychology, before it acquired the 
need to become a “science”. It is significant to take cognisance of this, in the context of equal 
dialogical engagement between the “psychologies”, because there needs to be flexibility 
towards inquiry beyond western psychological boundaries. 
In a context of equal dialogical engagement there is also the potential for sharing information 
and the co-evolving of new ideas to better meet and represent the “psychological” needs of 
our multicultural society. In a diverse society it would be faulty thinking to try and find the 
best solution to a problem as offered by one group, culture or epistemology. We should rather 
work together, utilising our differences as a resource to find mutually beneficial solutions. 
Thus while we cannot, not have an epistemology, nor really transcend it (Keeney, 1983), we 
can be open to knowledge generated within other frameworks, which may serve to inform our 
own thinking, paving the way towards collaborative community oriented functioning. 
Collaborating to meet the “psychological” needs of our people means that rather than having 
one “psychology” trying to authentically represent everyone’s experiences, we should have a 
landscape of “psychologies”.  
Co-existence is particularly valuable when one considers the bi-directional influence of 
acculturation. It is all too common to assume that this process is unilateral and thus refers to 
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the acculturating of “African” people into western ways. But we should not forget that people 
of Euro-American descent born in Africa are indeed Africans as well. These people are also 
cultured into African ways of being. Therefore the experiences of South Africans are likely to 
resonate with more than one “psychology”, especially in the future, if our society becomes 
more integrated, a landscape of “psychologies’ will be required to meet and represent their 
experiences.        
A clear advantage of this knowledge sharing process must surely then be reciprocal growth 
and development for all the “psychologies” within the “psychology” landscape. Instead of 
functioning in isolated, disconnected ways due to concerns about maintaining their individual 
identities, co-existence implies the possibility of not becoming stagnant from a lack of new 
input. The various “psychologies” could learn to live together like a family, each with its own 
identity, yet still part of and a reflection of the whole, each serving to enrich each other. 
With a landscape of “psychologies” in dialogical interaction it seems logical that certain 
commonalities will be identified. Therefore it should be understood that we are not 
advocating that we work together despite of our differences, but rather because we recognise 
the value of difference, similarity and each other. This mutual context will reveal common 
ground from which potentially shared goals can emerge. All “psychologies” should have the 
welfare of the people whose lived experiences they represent at heart. However at a deeper 
level they should care for the “psychological” welfare of all human beings irrespective of 
their cultural or epistemological orientation. Creating an open “psychological” landscape, 
where all voices are equal, is the starting point for developing “psychology” into a truly 
empowering helping profession.  
In the context of co-existence there is an opportunity for enhanced complexity, in place of the 
oversimplification common in reductionist western approaches. This complexity enables the 
tailoring of culturally and epistemologically sensitive approaches to “psychology” rather than 
compromised adaptations of western psychology, when approaching clinical, research and 
community based matters. This is an argument that finds support from researchers such as 
Gergen (2009) who speaks of knowledge as a form of co-creation, where knowledge 
produced in a relational dialogical context is used to transform the way in which we live 
together and solve our problems. This principle can easily be extended to an epistemological 
level, and equally so to the relationship between “psychologies”, where finding complex 
solutions to complex problems is a logical step forward. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter we have argued that western psychology has imposed itself as “the 
psychology” landscape, when in actuality it should be a participant in a “psychology” 
landscape, along with its dialogical partners. Accordingly western psychology has, and 
continues to function in isolation, while denying the existence of other equally valid realities. 
We argue that western psychology in South Africa should define itself out of isolation and in 
the process facilitate a shift towards dialogical co-existence with indigenous African 
“psychologies”. This may in turn lay the groundwork for similar shifts in a global context, 
using similar notions of appreciation and co-existence, in place of selective inclusion and 
tolerance of indigenous knowledge and practices by dominant western perspectives. 
The call for redefinition and corresponding repositioning of western psychology is however 
complex and challenging. Factors such as globalisation will ultimately impact on whether the 
call for redefinition is taken seriously and put in practice. Perhaps what we need to do is 
facilitate a sense of curiosity in diversity, or more specifically epistemological curiosity.  
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CHAPTER 5 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I grew up in a fairly average middle class white home, with its fair share of divorce, 
alcoholism and emotional negligence. I remember being told in no uncertain terms 
that I would be disowned if I should ever bring home a girl who was not white, and 
that to do so would bring shame to the family. Perhaps my family had sensed early on 
that I had certain “dangerous”, liberal ideas that needed to be pre-empted. 
By my late teens I had dropped out of school and ended up making a living as a 
labourer. In the mornings myself and the other “black” labourers or “handlangers” 
would huddle around a fire while waiting for the permanent staff factory workers to 
arrive and open the gates. Our Baas (Boss) would wait in his car, keeping an eye on 
us so that we could not steal or break anything. In due course the day would start and 
the Baas would call on his repertoire of helpful instructions to ensure we did a good 
job of holding, carrying and most important of all playing the role of scapegoat when 
things went wrong. Is julle dom? (Are you all stupid?) Moenie so lui wees nie! (Don’t 
be so lazy) Ek betaal julle nie om rond te staan nie! (I don’t pay you to stand around) 
Hey is jy stupid? (Hey are you stupid?) Kom word wakker! (Wake up) Julle is almal 
useless! (You’re all useless) Jy is net so dom soos hulle! (You are as dumb as they 
are). 
It was a dehumanising and interesting situation, given that I was the only white 
labourer. It seemed to make the factory workers and managers very uncomfortable to 
see me working and sharing meals with the other labourers. As for me things were 
somewhat different. The other labourers accepted me, perhaps even more so than in 
my own family or culture. We shared stories and looked out for each other. We 
offered each other comfort when the Baas belittled us and always shared things 
equally. I had somehow stumbled into humanity in its most painfully raw form; these 
people were just like me! 
Eventually I found my way back to education through a series of fortunate events and 
after getting a matric obtained a bachelor’s degree in western psychology. This would 
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lead to a job as a psychometric assistant. I soon discovered however that separating 
psychometrics from the money and greed of the company was very difficult. It always 
struck me as strange that we would do testing on people who at times only had a 
grade 1 education or who were seeing a computer for the first time. I couldn’t help 
but wonder how these tests could possibly be culturally sensitive? I still clearly 
remember testing a candidate and writing on his report “must not work on heights”, 
he fell to his death from a crane two weeks later! I wondered how “this psychology” 
of ours had helped him. 
While studying my honours degree in 2008 I found that I needed a break from 
Johannesburg, which seemed to be rather dehumanising, stressful and harsh, like any 
big city. So I volunteered at a school for children with severe mental and physical 
handicaps in a township near Vryheid in KwaZulu Natal. Nothing, could have 
prepared me for what I saw and felt; all my “psychology” theories could not help. 
These children only wanted to be acknowledged, to get a hug, to have a hand be held 
and the right to exist, the right to live! I was an emotional wreck after day one; it was 
overwhelming to see humanity so raw and stripped to the core. The feelings rushed 
over me, it was like a cathartic vomiting of emotions. One case will never leave me as 
long as I live, a beautiful little Zulu girl who was raped at 4 months old! The whole 
experience changed my perspective on life and what is really important in life. 
By the time I got to masters level studies in western psychology I had developed a 
deep desire to work with my experiences and somehow use them to inform my 
thinking. It was in this context that I could progressively demonstrate my 
epistemological curiosity. 
 
This opening vignette reveals a number of interesting autoethnographic themes relating to my 
personal life journey. These include tensions with my culture of origin and exposure to 
people who were different, yet fundamentally similar to me. Being exposed to difference and 
diversity served to increase my epistemological awareness and sensitivity, which would later 
be refined through formal education or pedagogy. My childhood curiosity had thus turned 
into cultural curiosity, which ultimately evolved into epistemological curiosity. My various 
life experiences had essentially facilitated the process by which I developed epistemological 
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curiosity. It was epistemological curiosity that in part allowed me to formulate the ideas 
presented in this study.  
In this chapter we will therefore examine epistemological curiosity and its potential 
facilitative role in redefining western psychology. We also consider how epistemological 
curiosity contributes to our appreciation of diversity and whether it informs our desire to see 
knowledge systems co-existing as dialogical equals. Finally we consider various ways of 
embracing diversity, which may contribute to the development of epistemological curiosity 
and a sense of community.  
 
WHAT IS EPISTEMOLOGICAL CURIOSITY? 
 
Early in life epistemological perceptions are undifferentiated, as children grow they are 
however influenced by parents, peers, culture and education. Children thus learn to 
distinguish between different aspects of knowledge and form perceptions on the certainty of 
knowledge, its sources and its structure (Hofer & Pintrich, 2004). We carry these perceptions 
forward into the rest of our educational journey and seldom question their validity, unless we 
study within a framework such as postmodernism. This in itself is however still insufficient, 
as postmodernism is a product of a particular culture and epistemology, which falsely claims 
to be able to universally explain the construction of knowledge by all human beings. 
Accordingly the certainty of western presuppositions and epistemology is not effectively 
challenged.  
Epistemology then, as we understand it in this study, is a unique set of perceptions and 
assumptions about the nature of knowledge and that which can be known; held by all 
cultures, which both informs and limits their thinking (Becvar & Becvar, 2006). If this is 
what we understand as epistemology, then what is epistemological curiosity? 
First we need to clarify what we mean by curiosity. The Oxford Advanced Learners 
Dictionary (OALD) (2000) defines curiosity as, “A strong desire to know about something”. 
The OALD also indicates by way of example that curiosity can take various forms, such as 
intellectual or idle curiosity. Furthermore the OALD indicates that certain phenomena can 
become curiosities, or something that temporarily draws our attention and offers some form 
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of amusement. In the context of this study such a definition is limited in its applicability and 
restrictive if used as is. We therefore need to expand our understanding of curiosity to 
encompass its developmental, creative and aesthetic aspects before going any further. 
Dischler (2010) argues for example that creativity and curiosity are intrinsically linked, and 
that together they facilitate such activities as problem solving. To take this notion a step 
further, we can also for example argue that curiosity is a vital component in art and 
aesthetics, which are derived from creativity. Dischler (2010, p. 61) argues that, “We begin 
by trying something new (creativity) and then test it to see what happens (curiosity)”. The 
opposite can also be true where we use our curiosity to find information or ideas and then 
creatively apply this knowledge. In this study it was our curiosity about different 
epistemological frameworks that led to a creative idea, namely advocating the co-existence of 
epistemologies and their respective “psychologies”. Dishler (2010) thus argues that curiosity 
can drive the development of new things or ideas. 
Whitworth, Sandahl, Kinsey-House and Kinsey-House (2007) focus on different aspects of 
curiosity such as introspection. Whitwoth et al. (2007) argue that curiosity encourages people 
to engage in introspection and find answers within themselves. Accordingly curiosity yields 
deeper more authentic information about feelings and motivations. Crisp, Fernes and 
Swanson (2000) offer a similar argument, maintaining that curiosity is more than a state of 
mind or an inherited trait, it also represents an interest in the self. Clearly people who are 
curious about themselves and the way they think, have better resources for understanding self 
and others. It is this very same curiosity that may underlie the development of cultural 
curiosity. 
 
CULTURAL CURIOSITY 
 
When correctly understood, cultural curiosity represents the first major step beyond the 
everyday or naive curiosity which we have discussed thus far. Flint (2008) argues that 
cultural curiosity in its weakest form is something of an amusement. This could be likened to 
the “freak shows” of old, where people went to see freakish curiosities on display. Flint 
points to the example of the “cultural curiosity” of white settlers in Africa who marvelled at 
the African “witchdoctors” who captured their imagination and provoked their sensitivities. 
 85 
 
We believe that this sort of “curiosity” is not of any value and merely indulges the immature 
mind. When we start to look at other cultures and use what we have learned to inform our 
thinking and critically challenge our own cultural assumptions, we succeed in demonstrating 
true cultural curiosity. Crisp et al. (2000) argue that when other cultures become curious or 
curiosities it means we are on the threshold of challenging our stable subjectivities. Crossing 
this threshold takes us into the realm of epistemological curiosity.  
 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL CURIOSITY 
 
Epistemological curiosity is generally associated with pedagogy in current research literature 
and notably the work of Paulo Freire. Freire (1997) argues that epistemological curiosity is 
developed from, and is the result of having a more critical knowledge of consciousness and 
experience. Epistemological curiosity occurs when people adopt a reflective-critical position 
on their subjectivities, thus when the spontaneous curiosity of everyday living becomes a tool 
for critical thinking, it has transformed into epistemological curiosity. This is an argument 
supported by Pahl (2008) who argues that epistemological curiosity is revealed when people 
are able to be self critical; it is a bold, critical and adventurous form of curiosity. Freire 
(1997) goes on to argue that we should strive to shift and develop our curiosity to the point 
where it becomes epistemological. Epistemological curiosity thus has the potential for 
overcoming naive or spontaneous curiosity, leading to a life journey characterised by the 
quest for epistemological understanding. 
Gorlitz and Wohlwill (1987) focus on similar aspects of epistemological curiosity, arguing 
that epistemological curiosity is a mode of exploratory behaviour. More specifically 
epistemological curiosity denotes an interest in exploring how we symbolically represent 
knowledge and experience, it is thus far more advanced than mere perceptive curiosity.   
Epistemological curiosity as we understand it is an extension of the forms of curiosity 
mentioned in the preceding sections. In this study we would like to define epistemological 
curiosity as, the development of a sense of relativity with regards to our own epistemology, 
as one of many equally valid systems for representing knowledge and experience. 
Furthermore we view epistemological curiosity as a deep desire to understand how people 
from different cultures and epistemologies represent their knowledge and experiences as 
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noted by (Gorlitz & Wohlhwill, 1987). By contrast we extend this curiosity into a desire to 
understand how different epistemologies and their “psychologies” are understood in an 
“epistemological” landscape. This view of epistemological curiosity implies that it is an 
interest in how knowledge and experience can be co-evolved between epistemological 
viewpoints and the value of such dialogue. Freire (2000) argues that this dialogue helps 
construct knowledge, and understanding this process at the level of epistemology requires 
curiosity. In this context we agree with Freire (1997) that epistemological curiosity can 
become a tool for critical thinking, because people possessing epistemological curiosity 
appreciate the need for a balance between knowledge systems and are more likely to seek 
equality amongst knowledge systems and their “psychologies”. We also agree with Freire 
(2000) that the foundations of epistemological curiosity are laid in a pedagogical or 
educational context.   
   
 PEDAGOGY AND THE FACILITATION OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL CURIOSITY 
 
Pedagogy or education is widely considered to be one of the greatest challenges to social 
development in Africa. Developing educational capacity and ensuring that people have access 
to primary, secondary and tertiary education has become a critical part of the African 
renaissance. Therefore the questions we address in this section and in relation to this study 
are; first, whether this “education”; which still primarily reflects western knowledge and 
experience, creates a distorted image of the world’s knowledge systems or landscape? 
Second, what impact does this have on the development of epistemological curiosity? And 
third, what role do educational contexts play in facilitating the development of 
epistemological curiosity? 
When we consider the education which children receive, it is clear that despite being able to 
study their own native language, art and culture there is still a strong emphasis on maths, 
sciences, languages, economics and so forth, presented as western discourses. While these are 
clearly not western inventions, they are strongly associated with the western cultures, which 
created these fragmented categories and named them as such. This emphasis on western 
knowledge as an educational basis may be somewhat justified for preparing young people to 
enter modern capitalistic societies and is thus logical, but it also makes it seem as if western 
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knowledge is of greater value than that of other knowledge systems. As we have eluded to in 
the preceding sections this sort of distortion further contributes to the perceived superiority of 
everything that is western. 
By the time young adults get to university they take for granted that western knowledge is the 
basis for all knowledge and that its fields, disciplines, categories, theories, frameworks and 
paradigms are all encompassing and universal. Padilla and Montiel (1998) for example argue 
that there has been a collapse of epistemological “space” at universities, so that knowing is 
restricted to a single dimension, namely the technical and supposedly objective ways of the 
west. The study of “psychology” is a good case in point. Students at some universities study 
african “psychology” as a subdivision of the universal objective field of western psychology. 
The assumption being that the discipline as conceived in the west can have african 
“psychology” as a subdivision. African “psychology” is thus included in the landscape 
created by the west. This situation then implicitly denies the existence of an African 
“psychology” in its own right. Such a situation is epistemologically unjustifiable. The 
problem is that students lack epistemological sensitivity or awareness and therefore do not 
question the knowledge status quo. This means that sensitivity to epistemology and critical 
thinking remain underdeveloped during the school years. This is contrary to the critical 
thinking and stimulation that educational institutions, such as universities should instil.  
Gergen (2009) thus argues that appropriate knowledge and education are crucial for the 
development of enlightenment and critical thinking. In other words a diversity of knowledge 
is needed, to free us from dogma. Education based on this knowledge is in turn needed to 
transmit our understandings across generations. Contrary to this, knowledge can also function 
oppressively, as is often evident in our current education system, which is dominated by 
western perspectives. What we need then is an educational context that allows for dialogical 
engagement. 
For Gergen (2009) it is in the classroom, where the notion of dialogical engagement can be 
taught. It is a context where dialogue between equals, who at times have different viewpoints, 
can be modelled. Freire (1997) argues that the appropriate context for developing 
epistemological curiosity is a theoretical one, which is provided and shaped through dialogue. 
This sort of engagement then facilitates the beginnings of epistemological curiosity. This in 
turn connects with notions of dialogue between different cultures and epistemological 
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viewpoints. Epistemological curiosity therefore requires appreciation of the process of 
dialogue as part of the broader process of knowing and learning. 
Leach (2006) by the same token argues that epistemological curiosity facilitates the process 
of learning and knowing. Leach goes on to warn that it is very hard to model any form of 
dialogical education process, without a sense of epistemological curiosity. Without 
epistemological curiosity students cannot learn to truly engage in theoretical dialogue, while 
holding different, yet equally valid positions. Leach (2006) further argues that critically 
minded educators should utilise multiple varied approaches that stimulate this sort of 
dialogue. It is in these contexts of complexity, that the pedagogical space for epistemological 
curiosity emerges. Gorlitz and Wohlwill (1987) put forward a similar argument, indicating 
that pedagogical diversity and complexity illicit uncertainty, which stimulates 
epistemological curiosity. 
Clearly there is a need to integrate epistemological curiosity into education. This can be done 
in various ways. The first step may be to lay the groundwork for epistemological curiosity, by 
developing everyday curiosity and cultural curiosity during primary and middle school years. 
Clegg, Miller and Vanderhoof (1995) argue that teachers can do this by introducing 
educational activities that allow for the development of understanding and appreciation of 
different cultures. 
It is disappointing that the current outcomes based education does not stimulate curiosity and 
creativity, but rather guides learners down predetermined paths of inquiry (Dischler, 2010). 
Whitworth et al. (2007) therefore argue for the development of a curious climate in learning 
contexts, with a sense of playfulness and unconditionality. This allows for exploration and 
discovery in learning contexts, with space for adventure and unexpected outcomes. We need 
to develop learners who are explorers of their subjectivities and constructed realities. 
A further problem is the tendency to view curiosity in children as misbehaviour. Bright 
children tend to be naturally curious and are frequently labelled as troublesome. 
My own experiences with thinking differently resonate with this, as I have often been labelled 
a trouble maker, for asking “inappropriate” questions. Questioning western psychology 
seems to constitute one such form of “inappropriate” behaviour. 
Dischler (2010) argues that integrating information from all our senses and using it in 
creative ways requires curiosity about the world and an inquiring mind. It is thus harmful to 
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suppress curious questioning by learners and may require a sense of humility by educators 
regarding the limitations of their knowledge. Dischler (2010) further recommends that we 
read children good stories that stretch their viewpoints in order to facilitate their curiosity. 
Children should also then be encouraged to share their stories, much as we have done with 
the narratives, poetry and dialogues in this study.   
In the final years of high school the emphasis could begin to shift towards a greater 
theoretical level, where epistemological thinking can be introduced. Gorlitz and Wohlwill 
(1987) argue that educators should encourage learners to ask questions, which in itself is an 
expression of epistemological curiosity. Such questions need to cover areas such as the 
certainty of knowledge and the differences between knowledge generated in different cultures 
and epistemologies. Leach (2006) argues that this questioning stimulates intellectual growth, 
the immaturity of which is often typical of a lack of epistemological curiosity. Dischler 
(2010) argues that asking questions is a sign of creativity that should be encouraged. This is 
important for allowing curiosity in children to evolve beyond what they know, to what they 
can imagine, thus linking with the creative process. Whitworth et al. (2007) also call for the 
use of “powerful questions” that open up possibilities and invite introspection, creativity and 
insight. If learners have to put effort into their answers to a question on a topic, such as 
epistemology, then it is likely to have been in response to a “powerful question”. Whitworth 
et al. (2007) further argue that one of the best ways of teaching this sort of curiosity is 
through modelling of authentic being and genuine connection with others. This sort of 
relational context allows learners the opportunity to safely explore the complex questions that 
surround culture and epistemology. 
Clearly pedagogical contexts need to play a central role in the facilitation of epistemological 
curiosity. Understanding of cultural diversity relies both on knowledge of others as well as 
the group to which we belong, generated in a climate of curiosity (Unesco world report, 
2009). Pedagogy that recognises this process and invests in epistemological dialogue will 
ultimately contribute to our ability to live together. 
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EXPOSURE TO DIFFERENCE AND DIVERSITY 
 
“The acquisition of genuine cultural values incudes the instilling within the 
individual, of respect for difference and diversity” 
                                                                                    (Bailey & Smithka, 2002, p. 198) 
 
In the opening vignette at the start of this chapter I shared my own experiences of being 
exposed to people from a different cultural background. These experiences changed the way 
in which I perceived people who were different from myself, and resonate with countless 
similar stories of people, who after spending time with cultures that differ from their own, see 
themselves and their own culture in a new light.  
In this section we explore the value of cultural exposure and its potential contribution to the 
development and facilitation of epistemological curiosity. 
Cultural diversity is frequently framed as a sensitive problem that requires careful 
management, to allow for the peaceful co-existence of multicultural societies. Crisp (2010) 
for example argues that diversity has political, economic and institutional aspects that make 
for profound challenges in a multicultural world. Crisp (2010) further argues for the careful 
management of diversity, in order to resolve misunderstandings and avoid conflict. While 
such desires are understandable, they also implicitly frame diversity as a “curse” or a 
“problem” that cannot be fixed and hence is managed. This situation however misses a 
crucial point which is that, multicultural contexts provide an opportunity to learn, grow and 
develop from interaction with those who differ from us culturally and epistemologically. This 
leads Bailey and Smithka (2002) to the conclusion that the health of any ecological 
community (society) depends on a balance of diversity. Consequently cultural health is 
damaged by a lack of cultural diversity. Attempting to manage diversity does not facilitate 
authentic cross cultural interaction and instead creates a breeding ground for ignorance and 
sterility.     
Bailey and Smithka (2002) argue that cultural ignorance arises from a lack of exposure to 
cultural difference. If people spend time with representatives of a different culture, sharing 
their food, participating in rituals and learning their ways of living, then fairly soon the 
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commonalities in the human experience start to become evident. Furthermore the differences, 
which from an outsider’s perspective may at first seem strange, gradually start to make sense 
within their own context. Thus the fears or apprehension caused by ignorance is replaced 
with an appreciation for the meaning of cultural practices, language and values in context. 
Bailey and Smithka (2002) accordingly argue that people who are exposed to cultural 
diversity in non-threatening ways are inoculated against fears of difference. This is a 
sentiment shared by Yanoov (1999) who argues that it is well worth the time and effort to get 
to know your cultural “neighbours” as it will allow you to develop an enlightened 
understanding of culture and difference. This very same informed understanding will 
facilitate appreciation of “psychological” difference and its value, as part of each culture. 
Apart from its enlightening effects, exposure to difference is also useful for differentiating 
self and identity. These in turn facilitate an interest in others and that which makes them 
unique. Crisp (2010) therefore argues that exposure to social and cultural diversity can have 
significant implications for how you view yourself and others. Diversity thus defines the self 
and ones identity, in relation to others. Experiencing cultural and epistemological diversity 
can by extension then also stimulate curiosity in the way we think, and how people who are 
different from us think, in other words epistemological curiosity. 
Exposure to different cultures creates the opportunity for dialogue between people who 
function within unique frameworks. This sort of dialogue is the essential element in 
generating equitable cultural relations, both requiring and generating trust (Pratt, Manley and 
Bassnett, 2004). The European councils white paper on intercultural dialogue (2010, p. 44) 
puts forth a similar argument, proposing that, “Intercultural dialogue helps overcome the 
sterile juxtapositions and stereotypes that may flow from a worldview (such as that of the 
west) that emphasises…a global environment, marked by (factors such as migration, 
superiority, capitalism and uniformity)”. Intercultural dialogue thus enhances diversity, while 
sustaining social cohesion and development. Dialogue as part of exposure to difference and 
diversity paves the way for epistemological awareness and sensitivity. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL AWARENESS AND SENSITIVITY 
 
In the preceding sections we have focused on the development of everyday curiosity, cultural 
curiosity by way of formal education and the informative benefits of exposure to people who 
are different from ourselves. Furthermore we considered the link between these simple forms 
of curiosity and the development of a deeper epistemological curiosity. Now we will examine 
two key areas that both contribute to, and develop from epistemological curiosity, namely 
epistemological awareness and sensitivity. 
Awareness of culture and difference sets in motion a process whereby people gradually 
develop awareness of diversity, as it occurs at the level of epistemology (Kincheloe, 2003). 
This parallels a shift in focus from looking at difference at the level of ethnicity and culture, 
to a focus on how difference and culture are constructed, within broader frameworks of 
meaning and language. Epistemological awareness is thus the degree to which people are 
aware that their conceptions of knowledge and experience. It is an awareness that helps 
people to be more attuned to different underlying ways of experiencing and knowing. 
Kincheloe (2003) argues that awareness of the socially constructed nature of knowledge 
moves us to higher levels of reasoning about peoples thinking. In other words it moves us 
into the realm of thinking about our thinking. It is this very same process that we have 
demonstrated in redefining or rethinking our understanding of western psychology and its 
position in the “psychology” landscape. The title of this study in itself acknowledges the 
inseparability of epistemological knowledge, in the form of curiosity, from the process of 
redefining our current understanding of “psychology”. We are therefore arguing that 
epistemological curiosity; of which epistemological awareness is a part, is an essential 
element in the redefinition process.  This is so because it allows for a critical appreciation of 
the relativity of knowledge generated within different epistemologies and the realisation that 
no one form of knowledge can be superior. In this context of reasoning our call for an equal 
dialogical relationship between the “psychologies” is logical. Kincheleo (2003) argues that 
epistemological awareness allows people to better understand the collision of civilisations 
which is confusing when viewed at the level of culture alone.  
Essentially what we are advocating here is the development of a complex epistemological 
awareness that contributes to the seeking out of forms of knowledge production, that result 
from the inputs of multiple dialogical partners in a balanced knowledge landscape. This sort 
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of endeavour generates respect for knowledge diversity and drives epistemological curiosity. 
Downing (2000) argues that “psychology” or what we have referred to as the “psychology” 
landscape, is moving towards epistemological eclecticism, where different frames of 
reference are used to find areas of agreement. This shift is occurring as a result of an ever 
increasing epistemological awareness within western psychology and its dialogical equals. It 
is this emerging eclecticism that Downing argues will move western psychology beyond its 
current dichotomous thinking. Bowald (2007) comments on this shift noting that post-
modernism in itself creates greater epistemological awareness. With the growing acceptance 
of a post-modern stance in western psychology it is conceivable that there will be an increase 
in epistemological awareness. 
Related to epistemological awareness as a co-development is the notion of epistemological 
sensitivity. The term as we use it here relates primarily to sensitivity to epistemological 
context or the ability to see knowledge in context, much as we have done in chapter 3 
(Psychology in context). Battaly (2010) similarly argues that sensitivity to context is an 
important element in developing a sense of epistemic contextualism. Williams (2004) 
comments on people who posses this skill, arguing that epistemological contextualists share a 
common attribute, in that they are sensitive to context, seeing context as variable rather than 
fixed. Understanding that lived experience is unique within a particular epistemological 
context and that such lived experience is indeed “psychology” is a reflection of contextual 
sensitivity. Without epistemological sensitivity there is little room left for appreciation of 
knowledge diversity and even less for epistemological curiosity. Such insensitivity is 
repeatedly demonstrated by western psychology’s domination of the “psychology” landscape 
and on-going dismissal of indigenous knowledge as “unscientific”. 
Battaly (2010) further argues that we can extend our epistemic sensitivity by rethinking social 
roles, turning moral values, into epistemic virtues. Therefore we can choose epistemic roles, 
in much the same way as we choose values to live by. So for example, consider the 
introduction of a new form of psychotherapy that would be seen as moral within a western 
cultural and epistemological context. When this same form of psychotherapy is used out of 
context, it is the person who is contextually and epistemologically sensitive, who realises that 
its use has not only become inappropriate, but also epistemologically immoral. This 
sensitivity to epistemological context in turn facilitates the development of epistemological 
curiosity, which is partly based on the desire find morally justifiable ways for knowledge 
systems to co-exist without dominance and imposition by one framework.   
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EMBRACING EPISTEMOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 
 
Cooper (2004) argues that we should rethink equality and the value of difference, so that we 
can start to celebrate diversity. While it is common to see such usage of the term celebrate in 
research literature, we prefer to speak of embracing diversity. But what exactly does this 
mean at the level of epistemology and how does it relate to epistemological curiosity? 
Nash (1997) argues that we learn to embrace diversity by consciously putting effort into 
learning other people’s traditions, customs and beliefs. If applied at an epistemological level, 
this would mean that we try to learn about the ways in which people from cultures other than 
our own, think and construct meaning. We thus embrace diversity by showing 
epistemological curiosity or an interest in other epistemological frameworks. This in turn 
fosters a sense of appreciation for diversity and stimulates further curiosity in a reciprocal 
cycle. 
Nash (1997) further argues that we can embrace diversity by choosing to interact and live 
with others in racial harmony, by doing so we implicitly reject stereotypes and prejudice. 
Nash (1997) does however warn that this requires a strong sense of identity and a willingness 
to defy societies constructed norms. This of course requires a degree of epistemological 
awareness and sensitivity as mentioned before. Nash (1997) adds that a healthy self-esteem, a 
strong will and maturity, also help people not to relate at the level of race and to rather make 
decisions for themselves. 
Clearly then the approach that people use towards diversity is very important. Price, Boettler 
and Davis (2009) argue that most people consider themselves to be open minded to valuing 
diversity, but tend to do so at a cognitive rather than affective level. Therefore it is one thing 
to teach people about other cultures and epistemological viewpoints on paper, and an entirely 
different matter to actually get them to explore that diversity. It is much easier to speak of 
diversity at a distance, rather than trying other culture’s foods, talking to those culture’s 
representatives or spending time learning to interact with them. To impact people on an 
affective level requires opportunities for experiential learning, as these create a context for 
transforming thinking and beliefs (Price et al. 2009). This process lays the groundwork 
needed for diversity to be seen in a positive way and embraced accordingly, which stimulates 
epistemological curiosity. Psychologists can for example facilitate group work sessions in 
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culturally diverse contexts, with activities that challenge stereotypes and safely explore 
difference. Such activities can involve rituals, movies, dance, art and music to mention a few, 
all of which allow for experiential learning and personal growth. The variety of activities that 
can be used hint at the complexity involved when trying to understand another culture or 
epistemology and that to do so effectively requires consideration diversity.  
Cornelius (1999) argues that embracing of diversity can only occur when we understand 
other cultures as a whole, including their epistemology, rather than focusing on specific 
elements, which encourages faulty cultural comparisons. Cornelius (1999) further argues that 
in order to do so we need to move away from hierarchical ranking of cultures, shifting our 
thinking into circular frameworks that explore the multiple facets of each culture in its own 
right. Thinking holistically about cultural diversity helps us move towards a more complete 
understanding of difference and its value, increasing the likelihood that we will want to 
embrace diversity, instead of attempting to manage it out of existence.  
Embracing diversity means that we value each culture and knowledge system, acknowledging 
that they have their own worldview and dynamically complex culture. Cornelius (1999) gives 
three guidelines for initiating an embracing stance towards cultural diversity. First we should 
acknowledge the existence of indigenous people’s intelligence, realising that their knowledge 
is meaningful and of value in the modern world. Second we should encourage and respect 
indigenous peoples self definition. Finally we should value the distinctiveness of diversity in 
a multicultural reality as a resource. Clearly the underlying idea here is coexistence of diverse 
cultures, living in community with mutual respect, curiosity and appreciation. 
 
BECOMING COMMUNITY 
 
One of the greatest resources for embracing diversity is community. Despite the connotations 
of the word community, which has somehow come to mean poor impoverished settlements, 
we use the term here to refer to the human community. In other words, the term community is 
recognition of our relatedness as human beings. Manning, Curtis and Mcmillen (1999) argue 
that one of the best ways to embrace and value diversity is through building community. We 
can do this by showing respect for all human beings, for example by greeting people; friends 
and strangers alike. We can learn people’s names and greet them by name. 
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I frequently ask people who I see in passing what their names are, I only need to greet them 
by name a few times before they ask for my name in return. Eventually we form a relationship 
and in the process build community. 
It is in these relationships where the uncertainties and fears of difference are challenged and 
our relatedness within diversity is embraced. Manning and Curtis et al. (1999) conclude that 
in order to embrace diversity, we need to adopt a more human approach to life, developing 
our interpersonal skills, encouraging communication and advocating teamwork. In short we 
are all in community and our diversity makes it so. Embracing this complexity and 
stimulating our epistemological curiosity is both our gift and our challenge. 
 
OUR COMMUNITY 
 
This study has been a reflection of our community, our work, colleagues, friends and 
collective family. We function together as human beings, working in harmony, complexity 
and diversity. We choose this, we want it and we need it! Every day we demonstrate our 
curiosity and live our community. 
We humbly invite you to join us. 
 
“Being part of a community is having a sense of belonging. It is about being able to 
interact with other people in such a way in that a unique connection is made with 
others and within myself.” 
                                                                                                           (Jessica Morolong) 
 
“My engagement in community psychology has touched me deeper than any of the 
psychology books I have ever read. It often amazes me that while I go to a community 
with the aim to give, I receive so much more from them in return. It continues to 
stretch me in areas of personal growth, as I continue to learn about the basic 
principles of human connectedness. I know I will be a better Clinical Psychologist 
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because of the special community experiences I have had. I view these experiences as 
a privilege.” 
                                                                                                            (Chanelle de Beer) 
 
“Entering the space and slowly becoming part of the community which is not situated 
far from my home, has been a special, heart warming experience!  Feeling the rhythm 
and getting to know the heartbeat of who we can be together, is exciting!  I pray that 
in our togetherness each one of us will find something valuable to accompany us 
when the time comes to continue on our separate life journeys.  May we stay 
connected forever through our shared experiences.”      
                                                                                                                  (Tobie Muller) 
 
"Entering the community space taught me to silence my own mind and become 
receptive to my environment. I learnt that by joining a community that I had to 
become humble.  Through humility I sensed connection, not only with the children, 
but with my colleagues and others as well. Our connections became more 
meaningful.” 
                                                                                                                         (Karmen de Beer) 
 
META CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter we have argued that epistemological curiosity is a higher order form of inquiry 
and reflection, which mirrors personal growth and development. Epistemological curiosity 
thus follows from the foundations of everyday (naive) and cultural curiosity. We have also 
argued that epistemological curiosity has a key facilitative role to play in redefining western 
psychology and calling for equality in the “psychology” landscape. Epistemological curiosity 
may help psychologists realise that the history of psychology as they know it (chapter two) is 
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merely the history of psychology in the west. Epistemological curiosity therefore facilitates 
the appreciation of “psychology” in context (chapter three).  
From this study our understanding is that people with epistemological curiosity are more 
likely to appreciate the relativity of knowledge generated in different cultures and the 
corresponding need for equality between the participants in knowledge landscapes (chapter 
four). On this basis we investigated possible ways to facilitate the development of 
epistemological curiosity in this chapter.  
We argued that in order for curiosity to become “epistemological”, it must be facilitated in 
multidimensional ways. Such facilitation may be active, involving formal education or 
passive in the form of exposure to cultural and epistemological difference. Furthermore there 
is a need to facilitate development of epistemological awareness and sensitivity in 
“psychologists”, as these components are crucial to the development of epistemological 
curiosity. In our opinion it is thus inconceivable that the current training contexts for 
psychologists can facilitate epistemological curiosity, when they continue to function within a 
single homogeneous epistemology and ontology. Such contexts do not adequately develop 
epistemological awareness and sensitivity.  
Finally we argued for an embracing of diversity, at the levels of culture, “psychology” and 
epistemology. Embracing difference and diversity as we have done in this study is at the heart 
of becoming community and finding peaceful and respectful ways for our “psychologies” to 
co-exist.  
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APPENDIX 
Research consent form (sample) 
 
My name is Justin; I am a master’s student in psychology at the University of South Africa. I 
am conducting a study on how “psychology” is understood and the recognition of indigenous 
“psychology” in South Africa. 
You have been selected as a potential participant, because you form part my research 
community and therefore have relevant knowledge and experience.   
Please note that your participation is entirely voluntary and you can withdraw from the study 
at any time. If you do not wish to participate you will not be prejudiced in any way. 
Your name and personal details will be held in the strictest confidence, and will not appear in 
any of the research without your permission and acknowledgement. 
I would like to conduct an informal conversation with you that will not last longer than one 
hour, at your convenience. During this time I would like to take notes, which will help me 
develop ideas for the study. 
Participants with relevant community psychology experience will be asked to submit 
autoethnographic narratives at their own discretion. Again the option to do so is entirely 
voluntary. The narratives should include no more than a short paragraph, which will not take 
more than half an hour to write.  
Your contribution is of great value to the research and will add to the dialogue on different 
knowledge systems on South Africa. Your contribution will thus directly add to the future of 
diverse knowledge systems in South Africa. 
Thank you for your time, if you have any further questions please feel free to ask me in 
person or by email: Justinrcsolutions@gmail.com. 
 
I __________________________hereby agree to participate in research on how 
“psychology” is understood and the recognition of indigenous “psychology” in South Africa. 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and I can stop participating at any point, 
without being affected negatively. I understand the purpose of the research and know who to 
contact for further information. 
_____________________                                                                  ___________________ 
Participant                                                                                          Date  
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